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ABSTRACT 
The basic principles of Indian-law jurisprudence often appear disconnected with basic principles of 
American constitutional law.  Indian law, however, has a special significance to important issues 
of state and federal power.  This Article seeks to build on the work of prior scholars who have 
sought to connect Indian law to American constitutional values. 
Public Law 280 is a federal law that gives states control over certain aspects of Indian affairs that 
were traditionally within the scope of the federal government.  This Article argues that Public Law 
280 is unconstitutional under a doctrine of constitutional preemption.  Constitutional preemption 
is grounded in the system of overlapping sovereignty that forms the structure of the Constitution 
and should be understood as prohibiting the federal government from delegating inherently and 
exclusively federal powers to the states.  The power to manage Indian affairs is entrusted 
exclusively to the federal government, and Congress cannot constitutionally delegate it to the states. 
The constitutional difficulties raised by Public Law 280 are particularly relevant in an era when 
issues of federalism are at the forefront of legal discussion.  It is often accepted that courts may 
limit the federal government’s authority to exercise powers reserved to the states, but we should also 
take seriously the idea that courts may limit the states’ authority to exercise powers reserved to the 
federal government. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps no area of law raises more profound constitutional ques-
tions than federal Indian law.  The nature of sovereignty,1 sovereign 
immunity,2 the legal status of states,3 the distribution of power be-
tween state, federal, and tribal governments,4 and the scope of indi-
 
 1 See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 218–26 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) (discuss-
ing the tensions within Indian-law jurisprudence pertaining to the sovereign status of 
tribes). 
 2 See Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 357–58 (1919) (explaining how the Creek Na-
tion was a sovereign tribe and was “free from liability for injuries to persons or property 
due to mob violence or failure to keep the peace”). 
 3 See Frank W. DiCastri, Are All States Really Equal?  The “Equal Footing” Doctrine and Indian 
Claims to Submerged Lands, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 179, 179–80 (1997) (describing states’ argu-
ment that recognizing Indian tribes’ claims to specific lands will lead to some states hav-
ing less territorial sovereignty than others). 
 4 See McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 165 (1973) (“This case requires 
us once again to reconcile the plenary power of the States over residents within their 
borders with the semi-autonomous status of Indians living on tribal reservations.”). 
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vidual civil rights5 are just a handful of the issues that permeate Indi-
an-law jurisprudence.  Yet, the major doctrines of Indian law often 
appear hermetically sealed off from familiar constitutional principles.  
Courts have struggled to ground federal Indian law in constitutional 
text.6  Common themes in Indian law such as plenary power, the 
ward-guardian relationship, treaty abrogation, and tribal sovereignty 
that exist “only at the sufferance of Congress”7 bear no apparent rela-
tionship to the core principles of constitutional law.  Some scholars 
have tried to “reinterpret[] the sources of federal Indian law to be 
more consistent with our general political and ideological heritage.”8  
This approach sheds light on how current Indian-law jurisprudence is 
inconsistent with our political traditions.  In doing so, it also provides 
groundwork for more effective legal arguments by binding Indian law 
to basic principles of constitutional law. 
Building on these scholars’ approach, this Article argues that Pub-
lic Law 280 (“PL-280”) is an unconstitutional delegation of an inher-
ently federal power to the states.  PL-280, enacted into law in 1953, 
sought to assimilate Native Americans into state political systems by 
granting states extensive power over Indian tribes, including jurisdic-
tion over crimes and civil disputes.9  Although PL-280 raises a number 
 
 5 See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (interpreting the scope of the 
Indian Civil Rights Act in the context of claims made against a tribe for discriminating 
based on sex and ancestry); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (refusing to apply 
the requirements of the Fifth Amendment to Indian tribes). 
 6 The Supreme Court made this point with its rather understated acknowledgment that 
“[t]he source of federal authority over Indian matters has been the subject of some con-
fusion.”  McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172 n.7.  See also Lara, 541 U.S. at 215 (Thomas, J., con-
curring) (noting that precedent holding that Congress has the power to control the “the 
metes and bounds of tribal sovereignty” is not rooted in the Constitution (citation omit-
ted)); David E. Wilkins, The U.S. Supreme Court’s Explication of “Federal Plenary Power:”  An 
Analysis of Case Law Affecting Tribal Sovereignty, 1886–1914, 18 AM. INDIAN Q. 349, 349 
(1994) (“A central feature of this dynamic dialogue [between American Indian tribes and 
the United States] is the incongruous relationship between the United States Congress’s 
exercise of plenary power and the tribes’ efforts to exercise their sovereign political 
rights.”). 
 7 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978). 
 8 RUSSEL LAWRENCE BARSH & JAMES YOUNGBLOOD HENDERSON, THE ROAD:  INDIAN TRIBES 
AND POLITICAL LIBERTY 275 (1980).  See also Robert N. Clinton, There is No Federal Suprema-
cy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 115 (2002) (“This essay challenges the fed-
eral government and, most notably, the federal judiciary, to honor American legal tradi-
tions by abiding by the nation’s own founding principles with respect to the nation’s first 
people.”); Richard A. Monette, A New Federalism for Indian Tribes:  The Relationship Between 
the United States and Tribes in Light of Our Federalism and Republican Democracy, 25 U. TOL. L. 
REV. 617, 618 (1994) (applying constitutional principles of federalism to the federal-tribal 
relationship). 
 9 PL-280 was enacted as part of a general termination policy, during which Congress ter-
minated many tribes as political and legal entities, causing them to lose not only their 
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of constitutional questions, this Article focuses on one narrow issue:  
whether the powers that PL-280 grants to states are so inherently fed-
eral that they cannot be exercised by the states constitutionally.  The 
small body of case law addressing the constitutionality of PL-280 is 
premised on the idea that those powers are not inherently federal10—
this Article argues that they are. 
In arguing that PL-280 is unconstitutional, this Article also uses 
PL-280 to illustrate how Indian-law jurisprudence needs to be recon-
ciled with our basic constitutional principles.  This Article argues that 
the Constitution embodies a particular scheme of popular sovereign-
ty and that federalism is an integral part of that scheme.  PL-280 
demonstrates how these principles are undermined when Congress 
delegates to states powers that the people placed in the federal gov-
ernment’s exclusive control.  Accordingly, just as judicial protection 
of federalism is appropriate when the federal government exceeds its 
constitutional authority; judicial protection of federalism is appropri-
ate where the federal government inappropriately delegates its con-
stitutional authority to the states. 
Part I of this Article lays out some of the basic principles of Indian 
law prior to the passage of PL-280 and surveys the case law addressing 
the constitutionality of PL-280.  Part II argues that the power to man-
age Indian affairs is constitutionally preempted and that states are 
precluded from exercising it even if expressly authorized to do so by 
Congress.  Part III argues that because the power over Indian affairs 
is constitutionally preempted, PL-280 is also an unconstitutional del-
egation of federal authority.  This Article concludes that PL-280 of-
fers valuable insight into the relationship between Indian law and 
federalism. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
The passage of PL-280 fundamentally changed the power relation-
ships between states, tribes, and the federal government.  This Part 
briefly highlights how this change developed.  First, it discusses the 
general principles of Indian law to provide context for the passage of 
PL-280 in 1953.  Second, it looks at the passage of PL-280 and exam-
 
sovereign status but also their federal trust relationship.  See Charles F. Wilkinson & Eric 
R. Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 139, 150–54 (1977) 
(listing the tribes terminated in the middle of the twentieth century and discussing the ef-
fects of termination on those tribes). 
 10 See infra text accompanying notes 45–69. 
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ines how courts have interpreted, limited, and addressed the consti-
tutionality of PL-280. 
A.  Federal and State Authority over Indian Affairs Prior to the Passage of PL-
280 
Indian law has traditionally been based on the principle that Indi-
an tribes are “distinct, independent political communities, retaining 
their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, 
from time immemorial.”11  Accordingly, tribes retain the inherent 
powers that naturally accompany their status as sovereigns.12  Inherent 
sovereignty extends to aspects of the tribe’s internal affairs, but is lim-
ited by “the tribe’s dependent status.”13  Thus, courts have held that, 
although tribes are sovereigns, they have naturally lost some of their 
sovereignty by coming within the power of the United States.14 
In accordance with these general principles of sovereignty, states 
have traditionally exercised little authority over tribal affairs.  The 
seminal statement of this limitation on state authority is in Worcester v. 
Georgia,15 in which the Supreme Court overturned Georgia’s convic-
tion of two citizens for residing on Cherokee lands without a license.  
The Court described the Cherokee tribe as “a distinct communi-
ty . . . in which the laws of Georgia can have no force.”16 
The traditional view set out in Worcester has since shifted.  Today, 
courts generally view Indian law as a question of federal preemption, 
in which the degree of state power over on-reservation activity de-
pends on whether federal law, including treaties and statutes, pre-
cludes state action.17  Following the modern idea of preemption, 
courts have relaxed their restrictions on state power over on-
reservation activity.  States may now prosecute non-Indians for crimes 
 
 11 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832). 
 12 See Nat’l Farmers Credit Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 851 
(1985) (“The tribes also retain some of the inherent powers of the self-governing political 
communities that were formed long before Europeans first settled in North America.”). 
 13 Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 425 
(1989). 
 14 See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 331 (1983) (“Indian tribes have 
been implicitly divested of their sovereignty in certain respects by virtue of their depend-
ent status.”). 
 15 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
 16 Id. at 520. 
 17 See McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973) (“The modern cases 
thus tend to avoid reliance on platonic notions of Indian sovereignty and to look instead 
to the applicable treaties and statutes which define the limits of state power.”). 
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committed against non-Indians on reservation lands.18  Similarly, 
states may place taxes on transactions occurring on reservation lands 
so long as the “legal incidence” of the tax does not fall on the tribe or 
its members.19  Further, courts have held that states have “inherent 
jurisdiction on reservations with regard to off-reservation violations of 
state law.”20  But, while the basis for the rule has shifted, the general 
rule remains that states lack authority over tribal affairs unless author-
ized by federal statute.21 
In contrast to the limited jurisdiction courts have allowed states to 
exercise over tribal affairs, courts have held that Congress has “plena-
ry power” over Indian affairs.22  Thus, Indian sovereignty “exists only 
at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defea-
sance.”23  This principle was originally justified by the theory that the 
federal government has a guardian-ward relationship with the tribes.24  
More recently, the Supreme Court has justified it through a broad in-
terpretation of the powers vested by the Constitution’s Indian Com-
merce Clause.25 
Congress has enacted legislation pursuant to its “plenary power” 
on numerous occasions.  The Major Crimes Act, enacted in 1885, 
granted federal jurisdiction over certain crimes committed on Indian 
lands.26  The Indian Reorganization Act, enacted in 1934, was de-
signed to stop allotment of Indian lands and promote tribal self-
government.27  In 1968, Congress passed the Indian Civil Rights Act, 
which applied various constitutional limitations to tribal govern-
ments.28  These laws have generally had the effect of either enabling 
federal authority over tribal affairs or expanding individual rights 
 
 18 See New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496, 498, 501 (1946) (holding that New York 
had the power to punish offenses by non-Indians against non-Indians for disturbing the 
peace and order). 
 19 Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 458–59 (1995). 
 20 Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 354 (2001). 
 21 See Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 112 (2005) (explaining that 
state law plays a small role within a tribe’s territorial boundaries). 
 22 South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 343 (1998). 
 23 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978). 
 24 See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383–84 (1886) (“From their very weakness and 
helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Government with 
them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises a duty of protection, 
and with it the power.”) 
 25 Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989) (“[T]he central func-
tion of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to legis-
late in the field of Indian affairs . . . .”). 
 26 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006). 
 27 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–479 (2006). 
 28 Id. §§ 1301–1303. 
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against the power of tribal governments.  Perhaps the most expansive 
and important exercise of Congress’s plenary power came in 1953 
with the passage of PL-280. 
B.  Federal and State Authority over Indian Affairs After the Passage of PL-
280 
Enacted pursuant to its “plenary power,” PL-280 granted a great 
deal of authority over tribal affairs to the states.  This authority in-
cluded jurisdiction over “offenses committed by or against Indians”29 
in Indian country and “civil causes of action between Indians or to 
which Indians are parties” occurring in Indian country.30  Thus, crim-
inal law enforcement, which had been primarily enforced by federal 
and tribal authorities, and civil adjudicative jurisdiction, which had 
been primarily administered by tribal authorities alone, came under 
the concurrent jurisdiction of both tribal and state authorities.  PL-
280 did require states to provide full faith and credit to tribal court 
judgments.31  While it was not the first authorization of state power 
over tribal affairs, PL-280 was the broadest and most far-reaching.32 
PL-280 was passed for a number of purposes.  It was primarily part 
of an effort to terminate Indian tribes and assimilate Indian popula-
tions into state political systems.33  It also served President Eisenhow-
er’s goal of cutting the budget by replacing the Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs (“BIA”) budget with state resources.34  Finally, it was seen as an 
effort to curb perceived “lawlessness” on tribal lands by allowing a 
state police presence.35 
The grant of jurisdiction specifically applied to six states:  Alaska, 
California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin.36  Other 
states were given the option of adopting such jurisdiction if they 
 
 29 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a). 
 30 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (2006). 
 31 18 U.S.C. § 1162(c); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(c). 
 32 Carole Goldberg & Duane Champagne, Is Public Law 280 Fit for the Twenty-First Century?  
Some Data at Last, 38 CONN. L. REV. 697, 697–700 (2006) (noting that prior to PL-280, 
Congress had placed some reservations in the Midwest and in New York under state juris-
diction, but that with the passage of PL-280 “Congress for the first time injected state 
criminal jurisdiction into Indian country on a large scale”).  While the focus of this Arti-
cle is on PL-280, the critiques of PL-280 may be applicable to any federal statute authoriz-
ing state jurisdiction over Indian affairs. 
 33 Id. at 701–02 (noting that transferring reservation populations from federal to state juris-
diction would foster the cultural and political integration of Native people as individuals). 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (2006). 
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wished.37  Tribes, on the other hand, were not given the option to 
consent, but rather, were compelled to accept state jurisdiction.38  
When signing PL-280, President Eisenhower expressed “grave 
doubts” over the lack of a consent provision.39  Although the 1968 In-
dian Civil Rights Act added a provision requiring tribal consent be-
fore state jurisdiction could be granted, it was not applied retroactive-
ly.40  Not surprisingly, no tribe has ever consented to state 
jurisdiction.41 
C.  Legal Challenges to PL-280 
Predictably, several major legal challenges have been brought 
against PL-280.  In Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Ya-
kima Nation, the Supreme Court upheld PL-280 against an equal pro-
tection challenge. 42  In Bryan v. Itasca County, the Court held that PL-
280 did not subordinate tribes “to the full panoply of civil regulatory 
powers, including taxation, of state and local governments.” 43  The 
Supreme Court, however, has never addressed whether Congress had 
the constitutional authority to enact PL-280.  Only a handful of lower 
courts have ever even addressed this aspect of the constitutionality of 
PL-280, and none of them offers a particularly satisfactory analysis.44 
In Anderson v. Britton, the Oregon Supreme Court addressed an 
early challenge to PL-280.45  A tribal member convicted in an Oregon 
 
 37 Goldberg & Champagne, supra note 32, at 701 n.24 (noting that currently four additional 
states—Florida, Idaho, Montana, and Washington—exercise some degree of jurisdiction 
under PL-280). 
 38 Id. at 703 (“One of the striking features of Public Law 280, however, is the fact that affect-
ed tribes did not consent to its adoption and implementation.”). 
 39 Id.; Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Public Law 280 and the Problem of Lawlessness in California 
Indian Country, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1405, 1406–07 (1997).  Goldberg-Ambrose also presents 
some arguments similar to those contained in this Article, primarily that the lack of a 
consent provision is questionable in “a nation that grounds political legitimacy on ‘con-
sent of the governed,’” and the fact that treaties did not contemplate state jurisdiction 
and, indeed, often could be understood to specifically exclude it.  Id. at 1407. 
 40 Goldberg & Champagne, supra note 32, at 703–04. 
 41 Id. at 704. 
 42 439 U.S. 463 (1979).  In this case, the Court upheld a Washington statute taking jurisdic-
tion pursuant to PL-280, despite its discriminatory effect because “‘the unique legal status 
of Indian tribes under federal law’ permits the Federal Government to enact legislation 
singling out tribal Indians, legislation that might otherwise be constitutional offensive.”  
Id. at 500–01 (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)). 
 43 Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 388 (1976). 
 44 See Anderson v. Gladden, 293 F.2d. 463, 468 (9th Cir. 1961); Agua Caliente Band of Mis-
sion Indians’ Tribal Council v. City of Palm Springs, 347 F. Supp. 42 (C.D. Cal. 1972); 
Anderson v. Britton, 318 P.2d 291 (Or. 1957); State v. Fanning, 759 P.2d 937 (Idaho Ct. 
App. 1988). 
 45 Britton, 318 P.2d at 291. 
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state court of a murder committed on the Klamath Indian Reserva-
tion filed a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that Oregon did not have 
jurisdiction over his crime.46  The court began its analysis from the 
presumption that Congress has “plenary power over Indian affairs.”47  
It reasoned that states naturally possess police power over Indians 
and Indian country, but this authority had been preempted by feder-
al law.48  Therefore, when Congress decided to “withdraw” from that 
field, the state naturally assumed that power, and there was no ques-
tion of Congress’s authority to delegate.49  Finally, the court rejected 
the plaintiff’s argument that the tribe had only agreed, via treaty, to 
submit to the laws of the United States, not to the laws of Oregon.50  
Thus, “[t]he treaty was not the source of federal power, but it was 
merely a means by which dormant, federal power was exercised.”51  
On habeas review, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the Oregon Su-
preme Court’s analysis, explaining that Congress’s power over Indian 
affairs was “not so inherently or exclusively federal as to apply beyond 
the extent to which the federal government has preempted the 
field.”52 
Other courts examining the constitutionality of PL-280 have come 
to similar conclusions.  In Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians’ Tribal 
Council v. City of Palm Springs, the tribal council sued the city for a de-
claratory judgment that the city’s zoning laws were not applicable to 
tribal lands.53  The federal district court rejected the tribe’s argument 
that PL-280 was an unconstitutional delegation of authority and not-
ed that although Congressional power over Indians is “plenary” and 
“absolute,” it is not exclusive.54  The court held that Congress was not 
only able to take jurisdiction under the power to regulate commerce 
with Indian tribes, but was also able to relinquish such power.55  PL-
 
 46 Id. at 293. 
 47 Id. at 298. 
 48 Id. at 300.  The court reasoned that power over on-reservation activity is not inherently 
“federal” because (1) non-Indians on reservation are still subject to state laws and (2) In-
dians off reservation are subject to state laws.  Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 301. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Anderson v. Gladden, 293 F.2d, 463, 468 (9th Cir. 1961). 
 53 347 F. Supp. 42 (C.D. Cal. 1972). 
 54 Id. at 52. 
 55 Id. at 53 (noting that Congress has preempted the field of regulation of Indian land until 
the day when “the Indian has developed culturally to a point where he can deal with and 
manage his own affairs”). 
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280, consequently, was “a withdrawal by Congress from its preemp-
tion in this field.”56 
In Robinson v. Wolff, another federal district court upheld the con-
stitutionality of PL-280 in a habeas corpus proceeding.57  The court 
reasoned that the Commerce Clause authorized Congress only to 
regulate commerce and that a statute prohibiting murder “could 
hardly be placed in the category of regulating commerce.”58  None-
theless, it held that such power was not “within the exclusive purview 
of the government of the United States” and that it was an acceptable 
exercise of state police power.59  The court exercised great deference 
to Congress, holding that “the degree to which Congress should ex-
ercise its power over Indian affairs is a question, I think, for Congress 
and not for this court.”60  The court also rejected the argument that 
tribes contemplated being subject only to the jurisdiction of federal 
courts and not the jurisdiction of state courts.61 
Perhaps the most thoughtful discussion of the constitutionality of 
PL-280 came from the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Fanning.62  
An Idaho court convicted a member of the Coeur d’Alene tribe of 
driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.63  She 
challenged her conviction in part on the ground that there was no 
constitutional provision supporting the exercise of power under PL-
280.64  The court observed that “[o]n first blush, Fanning’s argument 
has merit,” based on the lack of an enumerated congressional power 
over Indian criminal jurisdiction.65  It then held, however, that, within 
the context of established “plenary power” over Indian affairs, no 
constitutional provision denied Congress “the power to regulate the 
operation of motor vehicles by Indians while in Indian country—or to 
pass such regulatory power to the states.”66  It then acknowledged the 
theory from Anderson that “states possess inherent jurisdiction which 
lies dormant while federal jurisdiction exists but awakens when fed-
 
 56 Id. 
 57 349 F. Supp. 514 (D. Neb. 1972). 
 58 Id. at 521. 
 59 Id. at 522. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 522–23. 
 62 759 P.2d 937 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988). 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 938. 
 65 Id. at 939. 
 66 Id. at 940. 
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eral jurisdiction is withdrawn.”67  The court expressly declined to “de-
cide whether these theories are legally and historically sound.”68 
These cases loosely suggest two basic theories to support a broad 
Congressional delegation like that contained in PL-280.  Under the 
first approach, Congress has the authority to “withdraw” from the 
regulation of Indian law, allowing inherent state authority to “awak-
en” and fill the void.69  Under the second approach, like the one ap-
plied in Fanning, Congress has the authority to broadly delegate its 
power over Indian tribes to the states, even if those states would have 
lacked the power themselves.70 
This Article argues that neither of these approaches justifies the 
constitutionality of PL-280 because (1) states lack inherent authority 
over Indian tribes, and therefore such authority cannot “awaken” 
when Congress withdraws; and, (2) the power to manage Indian af-
fairs is an inherently and exclusively federal power, and therefore 
Congress cannot delegate it to states.  These conclusions first require 
an explanation for why certain powers are inherently or exclusively 
federal and why the Constitution prohibits the states from exercising 
those powers, even when specifically authorized by Congress to do so.  
This explanation lies in the principle of constitutional preemption. 
II.  THE THEORETICAL BASIS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL PREEMPTION 
This Part sets out the theoretical basis for constitutional preemp-
tion, which will form the basis for the argument that Congress cannot 
delegate away the powers it delegated in PL-280.  It begins by defin-
ing the concept of constitutional preemption.  It then argues that 
constitutional preemption is inherent in the structure of the Consti-
tution for two reasons.  First, the act of constitutional creation is an 
act of popular sovereignty, in which the people divide sovereign au-
thority and set out specific limits on the authority of their govern-
ment agents.  Second, by dividing sovereign authority between states 
and the federal government and vesting specific powers in the federal 
government, the people created limits on authority that cannot be 
 
 67 Id. at 940 n.3. 
 68 Id. 
 69 This theory holds that “states possess inherent jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country, 
and that this authority lies dormant while federal jurisdiction exists but awakens when 
federal jurisdiction is withdrawn.”  FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 
6.09[1], at 538 (2005). 
 70 Id. § 6.04[3][a], at 544 (“Courts typically characterize an exercise of federal power au-
thorizing state jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country as a delegation of Congress’s 
otherwise preemptory authority over Indian nations to the states.”) 
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breached by acts of “normal politics”—as opposed to genuinely popu-
lar (constitution-creating) acts. 
A.  Defining Constitutional Preemption 
Constitutional preemption falls at the intersection of two doc-
trines of constitutional law.  The first is the familiar doctrine of 
preemption.  As a basic principle, preemption holds that “valid fed-
eral law overrides otherwise valid state law in cases of conflict between 
the two.”71  The Preemption Doctrine is generally described as arising 
from the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.72  Preemption 
may occur when Congress explicitly chooses to preempt state law73 or 
where a state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”74 
A wide variety of powers are shared between the state and federal 
governments.75  What about powers that are not shared?  The Su-
premacy Clause defines both the Constitution and federal statutes as 
the supreme law of the land.76  Therefore, the Constitution itself can 
preempt state law:  a state may be “excluded from a field by express 
language of the Constitution.”77  Accepting the uncontroversial prin-
ciple that Congress cannot remove a constitutional limitation on the 
states, it follows that the Constitution might preempt a state law even 
if Congress has specifically authorized the states to act.  This preemp-
 
 71 Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 770 (1994). 
 72 See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 234 (2000) (“As the Supreme Court and 
virtually all commentators have acknowledged, the Supremacy Clause is the reason that 
valid federal statutes trump state law.”).   But see Gardbaum, supra note 71, at 768 (“[T]he 
most common and consequential error is the belief that Congress’s power of preemption 
is closely and essentially connected to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.”). 
 73 See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (holding that federal law 
preempts state law “whether Congress’ command is explicitly stated in the statute’s lan-
guage or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose”). 
 74 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
 75 See Nelson, supra note 72, at 225 (“The powers of the federal government and the powers 
of the states overlap enormously . . . .  As a result, nearly every federal statute addresses an 
area in which the states also have authority to legislate (or would have such authority if 
not for federal statutes).”).  The growth of congressional activity in areas shared concur-
rently with the states has been a major contributing factor in the development of the 
Preemption Doctrine.  See Joseph F. Zimmerman, Preemption in the U.S. Federal System, 23 
PUBLIUS:  J. FEDERALISM 1, 13 (1993) (examining the role of preemption in the unifica-
tion of certain federal powers). 
 76 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”). 
 77 JAMES T. O’REILLY, FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW:  LEGISLATION, 
REGULATION AND LITIGATION 77 (2006). 
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tion can be thought of as “direct constitutional preemption,” but for 
simplicity, this Article will refer to it as “constitutional preemption.”78 
The second doctrine that constitutional preemption draws from is 
the Dormant Commerce Clause.  Under the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, the Commerce Clause not only affirmatively grants power to 
Congress but “limits the power of the states to regulate interstate 
commercial activities.”79  The Dormant Commerce Clause can be 
“waived” by express congressional action, justified by the idea that 
Congress can undertake “coordinated action” with the states.80 
Norman Williams’s conception of the Dormant Commerce Clause 
provides a framework for understanding constitutional preemption.  
Williams argues against the idea that Congress can “waive” Dormant 
Commerce Clause restrictions, reasoning that “Congress’s power to 
regulate interstate commerce is fully effective without adding to it the 
authority to approve unconstitutional state conduct.”81  He further re-
jects two other potential arguments:  (1) that the Dormant Com-
merce Clause can be waived because it is merely a “weak” restraint on 
state action, unlike other restraints such as the First Amendment or 
the Equal Protection Clause; and, (2) that Congress has broad au-
thority to authorize otherwise unconstitutional state action.82  Wil-
liams concludes that “the Constitution’s commitment to economic 
union and democratic accountability precludes Congress from vali-
dating state laws that would otherwise violate the Dormant Com-
merce Clause.”83 
Williams’s idea that the Dormant Commerce Clause cannot be 
waived illustrates the basic theory of constitutional preemption.  Wil-
liams focuses on the Constitution’s “aversion to state economic pro-
tectionism”84 to argue specifically for the exclusively federal nature of 
 
 78 The term “constitutional preemption” is not a term of art in the sense described here and 
therefore has not been used in a consistent manner.  Some commentators have used it to 
describe “areas of federal preemption, created by force of the Constitution, in which the 
federal courts formulate rules of decision without guidance from statutory or constitu-
tional standards.”  Alfred Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts:  Constitutional 
Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024, 1025 (1967).  To distinguish it from basic preemp-
tion under the Supremacy Clause, some have termed the type of constitutional preemp-
tion described in this Article as “direct constitutional preemption.”  O’REILLY, supra note 
77. 
 79 Norman R. Williams, Why Congress May Not “Overrule” the Dormant Commerce Clause, 53 
UCLA L. REV. 153, 160 (2005). 
 80 See id. at 193 (explaining Dormant Commerce Clause waiver). 
 81 Id. at 202. 
 82 See id. at 203 (noting Williams’s rejection of two widely held beliefs concerning our gov-
ernment’s constitutional structure). 
 83 Id. at 238. 
 84 Id. at 198. 
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the Commerce Clause.  This Article argues more broadly that any 
power that is “absolutely and totally repugnant to the existence of 
similar power in the States”85 or requires national “harmony and uni-
formity”86 is constitutionally preempted and therefore cannot be ex-
ercised by the states, even when expressly authorized by Congress. 
B.  Constitutional Creation and Popular Sovereignty 
Sovereignty is the idea that there can be “but one final, indivisible, 
and incontestable supreme authority in every state to which all other 
authorities must be ultimately subordinate.”87  Constitutional preemp-
tion is dependent on the sovereignty of the people.  Popular sover-
eignty can be thought of as passive, in which the people authorize a 
legislature to exercise sovereignty in their place, or active, in which 
the people themselves directly govern.  U.S. history encompasses 
both of these aspects of sovereignty:  passive sovereignty during times 
of normal politics and, active sovereignty during times of constitu-
tional creation. 
1.  “Passive” and “Active” Sovereignty 
The modern idea that the people are the source of sovereignty is 
often traced back to pre-liberal theorists such as Jean Bodin and 
Thomas Hobbes.88  But, the idea is perhaps most closely associated 
with John Locke, who posited a social contract in which participants 
protect their rights to life, liberty, and property by giving up their 
right to punish violators of the law of nature and agreeing to be sub-
ject to the will of the majority.89  Under Locke’s social contract, sover-
eignty is “passive” in the sense that although people must continuous-
ly consent to government, they need not continuously partake in the 
act of self-government.90  The legislature dictates the will of the major-
 
 85 Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 318 (1851). 
 86 Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 164 (1920). 
 87 GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 345 (1969). 
 88 The conception of popular sovereignty and constitutionalism described in this Part is 
heavily built upon that set out by Keith Whittington.  See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:  TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 110–23 (1999) (arguing that, in order to further and more accurately and 
properly understand popular sovereignty and constitutionalism, we should renew our 
commitment to originalism). 
 89 See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT §§ 6, 13, at 5, 8 (J.W. 
Gough ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1948) (1690) (explicating the notion of a social contract 
and how government works to “restrain the partiality and violence of men”). 
 90 See Joshua Miller, The Ghostly Body Politic:  The Federalist Papers and Popular Sovereignty, 16 
POL. THEORY 99, 103–04 (1988) (discussing how Locke, like Hobbes, “described a social 
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ity and makes decisions about the fundamental law, bound by the law 
of nature.91  Locke laid the groundwork for the idea of parliamentary 
sovereignty that is associated with William Blackstone.92  Blackstone 
envisioned a supreme legislature that is unbound by any external 
form of fundamental law.93  This vision lacked the American idea of 
an “unconstitutional” law because the Constitution was defined by the 
acts and practices of Parliament.94 
Blackstone’s “passive” sovereignty can be contrasted with more 
“active” models of sovereignty.  These models draw a distinction be-
tween the people and the legislature.  Locke himself argued that the 
people retained the right to disestablish the government if it was vio-
lating the law of nature and no longer serving the purposes for which 
it was instituted.95  Other theorists, such as Rousseau, argued that sov-
ereignty rested only in the people and was inalienable and indivisi-
ble.96  Rousseau argued that this sovereignty manifested itself as a 
“general” will, expressed by a majority vote of an assembled people 
engaged in public deliberation for the common good without regard 
for private interest.97  The idea of legislative supremacy contrasts with 
Rousseau’s vision of popular sovereignty:  the role of the government 
was not to create fundamental law, but only to implement and exe-
cute fundamental law made by the people.  Hence, Rousseau’s fa-
mous claim that the English people are “free only during the election 
of Members of Parliament; as soon as they are elected, it is enslaved, 
it is nothing.”98 
 
contract by which the people agreed to authorize the government to act in their names 
rather than to exercise direct power themselves”). 
 91 See LOCKE, supra note 89, § 135, at 68 (explaining that the law of nature and self-
preservation “stands as an eternal rule to all men and legislators”). 
 92 Locke is the “modern” source in the sense that Blackstone “built his concept of parlia-
mentary sovereignty on very old models,” particularly on that of Thomas Aquinas.  
STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINTS:  ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 
144 (1995). 
 93 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *156 (arguing that Parliament “hath sover-
eign and uncontrolable [sic] authority . . . concerning matters of all possible denomina-
tions, ecclesiastical, or temporal, civil, military, maritime, or criminal”). 
 94 See WOOD, supra note 87, at 261 (describing the British system as one in which “there 
could be no distinction between the ‘constitution or frame of government’ and the ‘sys-
tem of laws.’  All were one:  every act of Parliament was in a sense a part of the constitu-
tion, and all law, customary and statutory, was thus constitutional.”). 
 95 See LOCKE, supra note 89, § 222, at 107–08 (explaining the justification for governmental 
disestablishment). 
 96 See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 57 (Victor Gourevitch ed., trans., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (1762) (explaining a theory of sovereignty under which 
sovereignty is inalienable and indivisible, and rests exclusively in the people). 
 97 See id. at 60. 
 98 Id. at 114. 
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2.  Dualism and the Federalist Conception of Sovereignty 
The American vision of sovereignty during revolutionary times re-
jected “passive” sovereignty.99  The American Revolution was explicitly 
based on Locke’s idea that the people retained the right to throw off 
the chains of a tyrannical government.100  The Constitution, however, 
forged a third route between “passive” sovereignty and Rousseau’s 
radical “active” sovereignty.  Like Rousseau, the Federalists insisted 
that only the people could be sovereign;101 they departed from Rous-
seau by displacing “the people” from active self-government.102  They 
understood that it was not possible for the people to be constantly 
engaged in the kind of civic deliberation necessary for the people to 
act as sovereigns103 and further recognized that self-interest and inat-
tentiveness to public matters would generally reign over active delib-
eration and public-spiritedness.104 
 
 99 See WOOD, supra note 87, at 261 (“It was precisely on this point [of the relationship of the 
legislature to the fundamental law] that the Americans came to differ with the English.”).  
See also HOLMES, supra note 92, at 144 (observing that the anti-constitutionalist approach-
es of Thomas Paine and Thomas Jefferson were consistent with the British view, except 
that “[t]hey located sovereignty in the people . . . and not in the government”). 
100 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“That whenever any Form 
of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or 
to abolish it. . . .”). 
101 The Framers continually referred to the people as the source of sovereignty and empha-
sized that the political order derived from the people.  See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 
(James Madison) (“[T]he people are the only legitimate fountain of power . . . .”).  Thus, 
the Constitution was not a grant of sovereignty, but an authorization by the people to 
government officials to act on their behalf.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Ham-
ilton) (explaining the agency relationship between the government and its citizens). 
102 Joshua Miller describes this relationship as one in which the Federalists merely employed 
the rhetoric of popular sovereignty, but did not intend for the people to wield power.  
MILLER, supra note 90, at 106–07. Instead, the Federalists described a relationship in 
which “the people authorized the government to act in their name.”  Id. at 107. 
103 A second point is whether it is even desirable for the populace to engage in full-time, 
Rousseauan-style pursuit of the general will.  See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:  
FOUNDATIONS 230–31 (1991) (contending that the modern private citizen finds great sat-
isfaction not from an extremely active political life, as the revolutionaries imagined, but 
from engaging in diverse pursuits like sports, business, and family life); RICHARD A. 
POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 173 (2003) (“[E]ither democracy cannot en-
tail massive citizen participation or it is irrelevant to actual practice in modern politics.’” 
(citation omitted)). 
104 Madison presupposed that factions would be “united and actuated . . . [and] adverse to 
the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the communi-
ty.”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).  This, of course, paralleled Rousseau’s fear 
of factions and his argument: 
[W]hen one of these associations is so large that it prevails over all the rest, the re-
sult you have is no longer a sum of small differences, but one single difference; 
then there is no longer a general will, and the opinion that prevails is nothing but 
a private opinion. 
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Because the act of constitutional creation is itself a manifestation 
of popular sovereignty that does not occur in the course of ordinary 
politics, the American system of sovereignty can be understood as 
“dualistic democracy.”105  Under dualistic democracy, self-government 
vacillates between moments of “active” sovereignty and moments of 
“passive” sovereignty when the people are not present in the act of 
self-government.  During those times when the people engage in de-
liberative popular sovereignty—what Bruce Ackerman calls “higher 
lawmaking”106—they enshrine their decisions as a restraint on future 
political activity.  The role of a court engaging in constitutional in-
terpretation, according to Ackerman, is to preserve the decisions 
made by the people during the “constitutional moments” when they 
engage in an act of true popular sovereignty.107 
The people, of course, can produce only approximations of true 
popular sovereignty.108  Nonetheless, dualism offers a helpful guide 
pointing us toward the idea of constitutional preemption by prevent-
ing us from improperly conflating the government and the people.109  
By doing so, it focuses upon the importance of constitutional con-
straints to preserve the decisions made by the people in moments of 
 
  ROUSSEAU, supra note 96, at 60. 
105 Dualism contrasts the normal operation of government with sporadic acts of true, Rous-
sean-style popular sovereignty.  In Bruce Ackerman’s terms, “[d]ecisions by the People 
occur rarely, and under special constitutional conditions.”  ACKERMAN, supra note 103, at 
6.  They occur through a process of broad support of the people, proposals for constitu-
tional reform, and “mobilized popular deliberation.”  Id. at 266.  Sheldon Wolin has de-
scribed democracy in terms of “the political,” which expresses “moments of commonality 
when, through public deliberations, collective power is used to promote or protect the 
wellbeing of the collectivity.”  Sheldon S. Wolin, Fugitive Democracy, 1 CONSTELLATIONS 11, 
11 (1994).  During times of “politics,” democracy does not exist at all.  Democracy, in-
stead, is “a political moment, perhaps the political moment, when the political is remem-
bered.”  Id. at 23.  And while it is “periodically lost” and “doomed to succeed only tempo-
rarily,” it is “a recurrent possibility as long as the memory of the political survives.”  Id. 
106 ACKERMAN, supra note 103, at 6. 
107 See id. at 9–10 (explaining that courts serve democracy by protecting the hard-won princi-
ples of a mobilized citizenry against erosion).  See also WHITTINGTON, supra note 88, at 52 
(arguing that fidelity to constitutional text is crucial because it represents our capacity to 
govern ourselves and make binding decisions about our future). 
108 Thus, “[a] collectivity cannot formulate coherent purposes apart from all decision-
making procedures.  ‘The people’ cannot act as an amorphous blob.”  HOLMES, supra 
note 92, at 167.  The same is true of the creation of the Constitution:  “[L]ike all other 
political institutions, constitution-making bodies are merely imperfect procedural repre-
sentations of the people.”  CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-
GOVERNMENT 33 n.54 (2001). 
109 See WHITTINGTON, supra note 88, at 138 (noting that, because the popular sovereign is not 
active, “a government that claims the full authority of the people is claiming more author-
ity than it rightfully possesses.”). 
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sovereignty.110  As this Article will later explain, this understanding is 
crucial to the context of PL-280 because federalism is a particularly 
important, popular constitutional constraint on both states and the 
federal government. 
The very act of popular constitutional creation provides the 
strongest basis for an idea of constitutional preemption.  The people 
always retain their sovereignty and authorize the government to act 
subject to certain limitations.111  Federalism is a defining constitution-
al restraint in the American system.  Traditionally, states are thought 
of as “residual” sovereigns that receive all the powers not delegated to 
the federal government.  Accepting the federalist conception of pop-
ular sovereignty, this is only partly true:  states are not restrained un-
der the Constitution to enumerated powers,112 but they are still only 
agents of the people. While states possess unenumerated powers, the 
Constitution can still act as a popular restraint on state action. 
The relationship between popular sovereignty and federalism is 
central to the doctrine of constitutional preemption.  This point is 
again best illustrated by Norman Williams’s argument that the Con-
gress cannot authorize state action that is otherwise precluded by the 
Dormant Commerce Clause.113  Particularly relevant is Williams’s re-
sponse to William Cohen’s broad argument that “Congress can con-
sent to state laws where constitutional restrictions bind the states but 
not Congress.”114  Cohen argues that constitutional restraints that ap-
ply only to the states, as opposed to restraints that apply only to the 
federal government, “do not reduce the residuum of sovereignty pos-
sessed by the United States but merely allocate it among the federal 
government and the states.”115  Williams responds first that Supreme 
Court case law is inconsistent with the idea that Congress can waive 
 
110 See id. at 137–38 (discussing the virtues of dualism). 
111 Alexander Hamilton described the relationship of the people to the legislature as one of 
a principal to its agent.  The Constitution bound the legislature because the legislature 
was constrained by the terms the people placed on it when they authorized it to act.   
To deny this would be to affirm that the deputy is greater than his principal; that 
the servant is above his master; that the representatives of the people are superior 
to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of powers may do not only 
what their powers do not authorise, [sic] but what they forbid. 
  THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).  According to Hamilton, the Constitution 
was thus the “fundamental law” derived directly from the people, and the role of the 
Court was to ascertain and apply that law.  Id.  
112 Madison’s argument contained the caveat that states retain residual power over “all other 
objects” not enumerated in the Constitution.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison). 
113 See Williams, supra note 79, at 159. 
114 Id. at 203 (quoting William Cohen, Congressional Power to Validate Unconstitutional State 
Laws:  A Forgotten Solution to an Old Enigma, 35 STAN. L. REV. 387, 406 (1983)). 
115 Williams, supra note 79, at 204. 
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such federalism-based constitutional restraints.116  Second, he argues 
that Cohen’s theory “invites the same centrifugal forces that the Con-
stitution’s allocation of powers was meant to forestall and under-
mines the principles of accountability underlying our political sys-
tem.”117  Third, he claims that the constitutional allocation of power 
between states and the federal government could not possibly permit 
Congress to change that allocation at will.118  Thus Cohen’s theory, 
taken to its logical conclusion, would permit Congress to essentially 
“vote itself out of existence” or allow Congress to suspend the Consti-
tution altogether.119 
C.  Why the Federalist Conception of Popular Sovereignty Supports 
Constitutional Preemption 
The two models of sovereignty I have described—parliamentary 
sovereignty and popular sovereignty—are analogous to two con-
trasting visions of federalism:  the idea of federalism as a compact 
among sovereign states and the idea of federalism as a compact 
among sovereign people.  If the Constitution is a compact among the 
people, then a doctrine of constitutional preemption is necessary to 
preserve the division of power between the states and the federal 
government set out by the people. 
The state-sovereignty model is, in a sense, the analog to the idea 
of parliamentary supremacy.  Under this model, the federal govern-
ment is merely the product of independent sovereigns joining to-
gether and ceding away measures of authority to a central govern-
ment.  These independent sovereigns, then, are free of any 
constitutional constraints save those in their state constitutions or 
those to which they agreed in the Federal Constitution.  The popular 
sovereignty approach, on the other hand, is analogous to a more ac-
tive model of sovereignty.  Under this model, neither the states nor 
the federal government are sovereigns.  They are agents of the peo-
ple who receive their authority to act independently from a popular 
 
116 See id. at 204–05 (explaining the Court’s inconsistent jurisprudence on the waiver of fed-
eralism-based constitutional restraints).  Williams points out that the Supreme Court has 
prohibited Congress from authorizing states to violate both the Contract Clause and the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause.  Id.  He cites, for example, the Court’s holding that 
“Congress may not authorize the States to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id. at 208 
(quoting Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 507 (1999)). 
117 Williams, supra note 79, at 209. 
118 See id. at 210 (explaining why the Constitution forbids Congress to freely alter this alloca-
tion). 
119 See id. at 209–10 (discussing the dangers of accepting Cohen’s theory). 
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sovereign that reserves its right to modify or alter the terms of their 
authority at its will.  Thus, constraints on state power in the Federal 
Constitution are not constraints agreed to by the states as sovereigns, 
but constraints placed upon them by the sovereign people. 
On the surface, the state-sovereignty model is compelling.  Much 
of the Constitution suggests state sovereignty.  The Tenth Amend-
ment reserves rights not granted to the federal government to the 
states and the people.120  The president is not elected by the people, 
but by electors from the states.121  Finally, the Senate serves to repre-
sent the states, not the people as a whole.122  Madison, arguing for the 
structure of the Senate in The Federalist No. 62, explicitly appealed to 
the idea of the Senate as “giving to the state governments such an 
agency in the formation of the federal government, as must secure 
the authority of the former.”123  Similarly, according to Madison, the 
very nature of an enumerated federal government “leaves to the sev-
eral States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other ob-
jects.”124 
The state-sovereignty model supports what might be thought of as 
a “thin” doctrine of constitutional preemption.  At its most basic lev-
el, federalism derives from the idea of a compact among sovereigns 
for mutual protection.  Locke, for example, separated powers into 
the legislative, executive, and “federative.”  The federative power 
managed the relationship between those governed by the compact 
with external forces that were not.125  Even Montesquieu, an advocate 
of small republics, acknowledged the utility in a confederation for the 
 
120 See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Consti-
tution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.”). 
121 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (explaining that democratically elected senators and repre-
sentatives elect the President). 
122 The passage of the Seventeenth Amendment, while shifting the election of senators from 
state legislatures to state voters, does not diminish the fact that the Senate still represents 
individual states, given the fact that states are still apportioned two seats regardless of 
population.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (describing how the senators were chosen by the 
legislature); U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (“The Senate of the United States shall be com-
posed of two Senators from each State, elected by the People thereof for six years; and 
each Senator shall have one Vote.”). 
123 THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison). 
124 THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison). 
125 Locke draws the distinction between “the execution of the municipal laws of the society 
within itself” and “the management of the security and interest of the public without.”  
LOCKE, supra note 89, § 147.  Under this distinction, the executive power is bound by pos-
itive legislation, while the federative power is bound only by the prudence of those who 
exercise it.  Id. 
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common defense.126  Madison argued that “[i]f we are to be one na-
tion in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other na-
tions.”127 
Thus, the state-sovereignty model suggests at least a degree of 
constitutional preemption to which the states are, by the nature of 
their agreement, precluded from engaging in foreign affairs that im-
plicate the whole.  This “thin” notion of constitutional preemption is 
suggested by the constitutional prohibition on states entering into 
treaties, alliances, or confederations or making compacts with one 
another without the consent of Congress.128 
Despite its appeal, the state-sovereignty model is not a compelling 
description of the republic.  First, such a model is incompatible with 
the central legal and political arguments the Federalists posed to 
support ratification.  The central theoretical obstacle to the Constitu-
tion was the anti-federalist claim that only one sovereign could rule 
and that the state governments were the only sovereigns in their terri-
tory.129  Logically, “two sovereignties can not co-exist within the same 
limits” and placing them together would ultimately lead to “the even-
tual annihilation of the state sovereignties.”130  The Federalists re-
solved this problem by taking the position that sovereignty could only 
rest in the hands of the people.131  They argued that both state and 
federal governments could exist in the same territory because neither 
was sovereign; they both were merely agents authorized to act by the 
sovereign people.132  And, because the sovereign people could author-
ize each government to act within its respective sphere, “[t]hey can 
no more clash than two parallel lines can meet.”133  Thus, the gist of 
the federalist argument was that “[t]he state legislatures could there-
 
126 Montesquieu argued:  
In an extensive republic the public good is sacrificed to a thousand private views; it 
is subordinate to exceptions, and depends on accidents.  In a small one, the inter-
est of the public is more obvious, better understood, and more within reach of 
every citizen; abuses have less extent, and of course, are less protected.   
BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 120, at § 16 (Thomas Nugent 
trans., Hafner Pub. Co. 1949) (1748). 
127 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison). 
128 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
129 Wood, supra note 87, at 527–29. 
130 Id. at 529 (citation omitted). 
131 See supra note 101. 
132 See Wood, supra note 87, at 530–31 (describing how neither the state nor federal govern-
ment could be sovereign because the people can distribute one portion to the state gov-
ernment and one portion to the federal government); Miller, supra note 90, at 106 (“The 
Federalists would have denied that they advocated any sovereignty in the United States 
except that of the people.”). 
133 Wood, supra note 87, at 529. 
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fore never lose their sovereignty under the new Constitution, as the 
Antifederalists claimed, because they never possessed it.”134 
Most powerfully, the very illegality of the act of constitutional cre-
ation emphasized that it was a popular act, not a state act.  Madison 
defended the decision not to follow the unanimous consent provision 
in the Articles of Confederation.  He cited the Declaration of Inde-
pendence for the proposition that the people have a right to “abolish 
or alter their governments as to them shall seem most likely to effect 
their safety and happiness.”135  The Convention, for Madison, was a 
group of “patriotic and respectable citizen[s]” taking action on behalf 
of a people who could not “spontaneously and universally . . . move in 
concert towards their object.”136  If the Convention’s proposal were 
“submitted to the people themselves,” its “supreme authority” would 
“blot out all antecedent errors and irregularities.”137  By conceding 
the illegality of the Convention, Madison enhanced the authority of 
the convention by “linking it to the institutional form that Publius’s 
contemporaries associated most intimately with We the People.”138  In 
other words, the very reason the Constitution was legitimate was that 
it did not follow the requirements of the Articles of Confederation, 
but rather was created by the people themselves. 
Because constitutional creation is an act of popular sovereignty, 
the people, through the act of constitutional creation, placed certain 
powers in the hands of the federal government and reserved others 
for state governments.  Therefore, just as the federal government may 
not reach beyond its enumerated powers into inherently state powers, 
states cannot infringe on the realm of inherently federal powers.  The 
“lines” of federalism were drawn by the people themselves, and be-
cause neither the states nor the federal government are sovereigns 
capable of exchanging their powers. Therefore, this limitation applies 
to delegations of power just as much as it applies to usurpations of 
power. 
 
134 Id. at 531.  See also id. at 530 (“More boldly and more fully than anyone else, [James] Wil-
son developed the argument that would eventually become the basis of all Federalist 
thinking.”).  Wilson countered the anti-federalist appeal to state sovereignty with the ar-
gument that “sovereignty always stayed with the people-at-large,” who could only delegate 
it on limited terms to the government.  Id. 
135 THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madison). 
136 Id. 
137 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
138 Ackerman, supra note 103, at 175.  See also Whittington, supra note 88, at 125 (arguing 
that the device of a popular convention made “a sharp distinction between government 
and society and emphasized that ultimate political authority resided in the latter”). 
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III.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL PREEMPTION OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 
This Part argues that PL-280 is an unconstitutional delegation of 
inherently and exclusive federal powers to the states.  First, this Part 
sets out a framework for determining whether a federal power is con-
stitutionally preempted.  Second, it looks at the source of federal 
powers over Indian affairs to conclude that this power is constitution-
ally preempted.  Third, it describes how the doctrine of constitutional 
preemption should apply to PL-280 in particular. 
A.  The Framework for Constitutional Preemption 
The first step in determining whether a state’s exercise of a par-
ticular federal power is constitutionally preempted is to set out a 
standard for determining which powers are constitutionally preempt-
ed.  Although this issue has arisen infrequently, the basic framework 
for constitutional preemption was set out by Alexander Hamilton in 
The Federalist No. 32 and elaborated by the Supreme Court in several 
cases. 
1.  The Federalist No. 32 
In The Federalist No. 32, Alexander Hamilton sought to reassure 
the states that the federal power to tax would not deprive states of 
their concurrent power to do so.139  He argued that if the union were 
a complete consolidation, the states would retain only those powers 
provided by the “general will.”140  Because the union amounted to on-
ly a partial consolidation, states would retain all rights of sovereignty 
except those “exclusively delegated to the United States.”141  Three cat-
egories of powers would be within the exclusive province of the fed-
eral government: 
[1] where the Constitution in express terms granted an exclusive authori-
ty to the Union; [2] where it granted in one instance an authority to the 
Union and in another prohibited the States from exercising the like au-
thority; and [3] where it granted an authority to the Union, to which a 
similar authority in the States would be absolutely and totally contradic-
tory and repugnant.142 
 
139 THE FEDERALIST NO. 32 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[I]ndividual States should possess an 
independent and uncontrolable [sic] authority to raise their own revenues for the supply 
of their own wants.”). 
140 Id. at 217. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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By Hamilton’s own terms, the “totally contradictory and repugnant” 
category was intentionally narrow, and it was necessary to distinguish 
it from those circumstances in which there were conflicts of policy 
but no “direct contradiction or repugnancy in point of constitutional 
authority.”143 
Hamilton offered examples of exclusively federal powers.  Legisla-
tion over the district to be the seat of government was, by express 
constitutional language, “exclusive.”144  The clause providing the 
power to lay imposts or duties on imports or exports explicitly pro-
hibited states from exercising that power, subject to the caveat that 
states could do so with congressional consent.145  Finally, the clause 
providing Congress the power “to establish an [sic] uniform rule of 
naturalization” was necessarily exclusively federal; otherwise, the rule 
would not be uniform.146 
The Federalist No. 32 offers a clear and simple framework for un-
derstanding the idea of constitutional preemption.  It does not, how-
ever, resolve the question of whether Congress can constitutionally 
delegate its authority over an exclusively federal power to the states. 
Several Supreme Court decisions shed further light on this question. 
2.  Judicial Approaches to Constitutional Preemption 
In Cooley v. Board of Wardens, the Supreme Court applied Hamil-
ton’s constitutional-preemption framework.147  Cooley reviewed a 
Pennsylvania law regulating the piloting of ships into the Port of 
Philadelphia.148  The Court, accepting that the regulation was within 
the scope of the Commerce Clause, pointed to a congressional act of 
1789 stating that piloting “shall continue to be regulated in conformi-
ty with the existing laws of the States” until further congressional ac-
tion.149  The Court held: 
If the States were divested of the power to legislate on this subject by the 
grant of the commercial power to Congress, it is plain this act could not 
confer upon them power thus to legislate.  If the Constitution excluded 
the States from making any law regulating commerce, certainly Congress 
cannot regrant, or in any manner reconvey to the States that power.150 
 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 218 (emphasis omitted). 
147 Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1852). 
148 Id. at 311–12. 
149 Id. at 317. 
150 Id. at 318. 
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The Court then considered “whether the grant of the commercial 
power to Congress did per se deprive the States of all power to regu-
late pilots.”151  It suggested two ways that this could occur:  (1) if state 
power was expressly excluded by the text of the Constitution; or, (2) 
if the nature of the power was “absolutely and totally repugnant to 
the existence of similar power in the States.”152 
Ultimately, the Court held that the power to regulate pilots did 
not “admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation” and 
therefore was not exclusively in the hands of Congress.153  This con-
clusion was supported by a tradition of state regulation in the area 
and the necessity of conforming policy to local needs based upon lo-
cal knowledge.154  As a parting comment, the Court suggested a strong 
form of Constitutional preemption:  if the Commerce Clause did de-
prive states of their power to regulate pilots, “it may be doubted 
whether Congress could, with propriety, recognize them as laws and 
adopt them as its own acts.”155 
The power most clearly “repugnant to the existence of similar 
power in the States”156 is the power over foreign affairs.  The idea that 
foreign affairs are constitutionally preempted is essential to even the 
thinnest conception of federalism.  In fact, the Supreme Court has 
used the language of constitutional preemption in cases involving 
foreign policy and international affairs.  The Court has held:  “The 
Federal Government, representing as it does the collective interests 
of the forty-eight states, is entrusted with full and exclusive responsibility 
for the conduct of affairs with foreign sovereignties.”157  This principle 
draws directly from the principles of federalism embodied in Locke’s 
federative power, Montesquieu’s description of the confederate re-
public, and Madison’s argument that, if federalism means anything, it 
means the central government possesses sole authority to speak for 
the units on matters of foreign policy.158  It is also consistent with the 
 
151 Id. 
152 Id.  Following the framework set out in The Federalist No. 32, the Court cited the power to 
legislate for the District of Columbia as an example of one such power.  Id. 
153 Id. at 319. 
154 See id. (“[L]egislative discretion of the several States should deem applicable to the local 
peculiarities of the ports within their limits.”) 
155 Id. at 321. 
156 Id. at 318. 
157 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) (emphasis added).  The Court further ex-
plained:  “Our system of government is such that the interest of the cities, counties and 
states, no less than the interest of the people of the whole nation, imperatively requires 
that federal power in the field affecting foreign relations be entirely free from local inter-
ference.”  Id. 
158 See supra notes 125–27. 
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Framers’ view that the primary end of the federal government was 
collective safety and security.159 
Zschernig v. Miller demonstrates the broad scope of the Court’s ap-
proach to the constitutional preemption of foreign affairs.160  Zschernig 
concerned an Oregon law that placed limitations on the right of non-
resident aliens to inherit property in Oregon.161  One of these limita-
tions was that the foreign heirs must have the right to receive the 
proceeds “without confiscation.”162  Determining whether confiscation 
occurred “led into minute inquiries concerning the actual admin-
istration of foreign law.”163  It would have required Oregon probate 
judges to make determinations regarding whether foreign citizens en-
joyed the same rights as Oregon citizens.164  According to the Court, 
its earlier precedent did not permit “[t]hat kind of state involvement 
in foreign affairs and international relations—matters which the Con-
stitution entrusts solely to the Federal Government.”165  The Court 
went on to emphasize the exclusive nature of federal control over 
foreign affairs: 
The several States, of course, have traditionally regulated the descent and 
distribution of estates.  But those regulations must give way if they impair 
the effective exercise of the Nation’s foreign policy.  Where those laws 
conflict with a treaty, [the states] must bow to the superior federal policy 
. . . .   Certainly a State could not deny admission to a traveler from East 
Germany nor bar its citizens from going there.  If there are to be such re-
straints, they must be provided by the Federal Government.  The present 
 
159 The authors of The Federalist believed that “[t]he utility of such a Union, and therefore 
the chief ends it will serve, is that it will strengthen the American people against the dan-
gers of ‘foreign war’ and secure them from the dangers of ‘domestic convulsion.’”  Martin 
Diamond, Democracy and The Federalist:  A Reconsideration of the Framers’ Intent, 53 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 52, 62 (1959).  These themes are repeated throughout the first set of the Feder-
alist Papers, entitled “The utility of the UNION to your political prosperity.”  THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton).  John Jay argued that “[a]mong the many ob-
jects to which a wise and free people find it necessary to direct their attention, that of 
providing for their safety seems to be first.”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay).  He went 
on to argue that in the case of war, the federal government “most favors the safety of the 
people.”  Id.  Furthermore, Jay argued that, for a number of reasons, one federal gov-
ernment would be better equipped to avoid foreign wars than state governments.  THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 4 (John Jay).  The Federalists also frequently cited ancient Greek con-
federacies as examples of federal systems that ultimately failed due to weakness, disunity, 
and decentralization.  CARL J. RICHARD, THE FOUNDERS AND THE CLASSICS: GREECE, ROME, 
AND THE AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT 104–10 (1994). 
160 389 U.S. 429 (1968). 
161 Id. at 430–31. 
162 Id. at 431. 
163 Id. at 435. 
164 Id. at 440 (holding that the statute “seems to make unavoidable judicial criticism of na-
tions established on a more authoritarian basis than our own”). 
165 Id. at 436. 
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Oregon law . . . has a direct impact upon foreign relations and may well 
adversely affect the power of the central government to deal with those 
problems.166 
At least in the area of foreign affairs, the idea of constitutional 
preemption has been adopted by the Supreme Court.  But, how does 
constitutional preemption apply to other powers?  More importantly, 
how does it apply when Congress actually delegates its own power to 
the states? 
This precise situation was addressed in Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stew-
art.167  In Knickerbocker, the Supreme Court addressed the validity of a 
law that applied the workmen’s compensation laws of the states to in-
juries that occurred within maritime and admiralty jurisdiction.168  
The Court held that the very nature of the Article I grant prevented 
Congress from delegating it: 
The subject was intrusted [sic] to [Congress] to be dealt with according 
to its discretion—not for delegation to others . . . .  [S]uch an authoriza-
tion would inevitably destroy the harmony and uniformity which the 
Constitution not only contemplated but actually established—it would 
defeat the very purpose of the grant.169 
According to the Court, if Congress could allow states to make their 
own laws regarding maritime employment, “there [would] at once 
arise the confusion and uncertainty which the Framers of the Consti-
tution both foresaw and undertook to prevent.”170 
Nonetheless, nearly forty years later, the Court took a much more 
deferential approach to constitutional preemption.  A situation rela-
tively analogous to the situation of PL-280 arose in United States v. 
Sharpnack.171  Sharpnack involved the prosecution of a sex crime under 
the 1948 Assimilative Crimes Act.172  The Act applied state criminal 
law to crimes committed in federal enclave jurisdiction, even if those 
laws were passed subsequent to the passage of the Act.173  The Court 
held that this did not constitute a delegation of power to the states, 
but was simply a matter of Congress adopting state law as its own.174 
 
166 Id. at 440–41 (citations omitted). 
167 Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920). 
168 Id. at 150–51. 
169 Id. at 164. 
170 Id. at 166. 
171 355 U.S. 286 (1958). 
172 Id. at 286–87. 
173 Id. at 287–88. 
174 Id. at 293–94 (“The basic legislative decision made by Congress is its decision to conform 
the laws in the enclaves to the local laws as to all offenses not punishable by any enact-
ment of Congress.”). 
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Justice William Douglas dissented, laying out an argument that 
applies equally to the delegation in PL-280.175  He argued that, alt-
hough Congress can set up a scheme and leave it up to the states to 
fill in the details: 
[I]t is Congress that must determine the policy, for that is the essence of 
lawmaking.  Under the scheme now approved a State makes such federal 
law, applicable to the enclave, as it likes, and that law becomes federal 
law, for the violation of which the citizen is sent to prison.   
  Here it is a sex crime on which Congress has never legislated.  To-
morrow it may be . . . a law that could never command a majority in the 
Congress or that in no sense reflected its will . . . .  [The defendant] is en-
titled to the considered judgment of Congress whether the law applied to 
him fits the federal policy.  That is what federal lawmaking is.176 
Justice Douglas argued that while the Act was more convenient for 
Congress, “convenience is not material to the constitutional prob-
lem.”177  The law simply amounted to “a State, not the Congress,” ex-
ercising Article I legislative powers.178 
The majority in Knickerbocker and Douglas’s dissent in Sharpnack 
both framed the issue in terms of nondelegation rather than preemp-
tion, but read together with Cooley, they help to refine the framework 
set up by Hamilton.  Hamilton’s third category of exclusively federal 
powers might be separated into (1) powers that most seriously de-
mand the harmony and uniformity of national action, and (2) powers 
that deal with matters external to the union or necessary for to the 
regulation of its members. 
How do we define these two categories of inherently federal pow-
ers?  Matters of foreign policy would fall in this category, and Knicker-
bocker suggests that admiralty and maritime laws would as well.  Be-
yond this, precedent offers little insight into which constitutional 
powers are so inherently federal as to meet this test.  One might im-
agine other Article I powers falling in this category—naturalization, 
the coining of money, the regulation of federal courts—at least inso-
far as these powers do not overlap with state police powers.179  Anoth-
er power that more directly relates to the regulation of relations 
among states is the congressional power to consent to an interstate 
compact.180  There is something uniquely federal about these powers 
 
175 Id. at 297 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
176 Id. at 299. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
180 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress  . . . enter into 
any Agreement or Compact with another state . . . .”). 
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that Congress could not constitutionally delegate them to the states.  
The next Subpart examines the power to manage Indian affairs and 
concludes that it is constitutionally preempted under the standards I 
have described. 
B.  The Sources of Federal Power over Indian Affairs 
Building on the framework set out in The Federalist No. 32 and fur-
ther defined in Cooley and Knickerbocker, this Subpart argues that the 
power to manage Indian affairs is inherently and exclusively federal.  
This determination is based on the two most plausible sources of fed-
eral power:  “internal” sources, namely the Indian Commerce 
Clause,181 and “external” sources, namely the Treaty Power182 and trea-
ties themselves. 
1.  The Indian Commerce Clause 
The Constitution makes only a few references to Indians or Indian 
tribes, so caution is necessary when attempting to locate an explicit 
constitutional source of federal power over Indian affairs.  Of these 
explicit references, the most important provision has been the Indian 
Commerce Clause.183 
The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power “[t]o regulate 
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and 
with the Indian tribes.”184  Particularly helpful for our purposes is the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, implying “limitations on the exercise of 
state authority over the same subject.”185  Although, as discussed earli-
er, this doctrine is often understood in terms of the Interstate Com-
merce Clause, Robert Clinton has put forth a powerful argument in 
 
181 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
182 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
183 In one sense, the most significant reference to Indians in the Constitution is in the Ap-
portionment Clause.  Both as originally written and as amended by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, this clause exempts “Indians not taxed” from being counted for the pur-
poses of apportioning congressional seats.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.  On the one 
hand, the clause can be understood as a restraint on state power, insofar as it provides 
“that Indians not taxed by the state are not within the polity of the state, especially not 
subject to its jurisdiction.”  Monette, supra note 8, at 630 n.83.  On the other hand, given 
the integration of tribes into the federal system, the clause may “support the contention 
that the tribes are now as much within our system as without.”  Id.  This Article does not 
discuss the Apportionment Clause in depth because it is not a source of federal power, 
but merely a description of how to apportion taxes and representation. 
184 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
185 Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1055, 1060 
(1995). 
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favor of a Dormant Indian Commerce Clause based on original un-
derstanding and historical practice.186  Clinton offers a crucial insight 
into the principles that take us towards constitutional preemption. 
The Indian Commerce Clause originated from the tensions be-
tween state and federal power that developed during the confedera-
tion period.  Early drafts of the Articles of Confederation contained 
provisions seeking to nationalize authority over Indian affairs, and an 
initial proposal based on these drafts gave the national government 
“sole and exclusive” power in “managing all Affairs with the Indi-
ans.”187  To accommodate states that insisted on managing their own 
affairs with the Indians, the ultimate provision contained the proviso 
“provided that the legislative right of any State within its own limits be 
not infringed or violated.”188  The negotiation of federal treaties con-
tinued throughout the confederation period,189 and the Northwest 
Ordinance of 1787, which created a government for western territo-
ries, contained broad protections for tribes and greatly centralized 
power to deal with them in the national government.190  Nonetheless, 
the confederation period was plagued by tensions between the state 
and national governments that “had led the young nation to the 
brink of Indian warfare on several fronts.”191 
The limited evidence of the Indian Commerce Clause’s passage 
suggests that its purpose was to centralize power to deal with tribes in 
the hands of the federal government.  James Madison proposed an 
initial draft of what would become the Indian Commerce Clause 
based on his belief that the new constitution must contain a provision 
 
186 Id. at 1058. 
187 Id. at 1100. 
188 Id. at 1103. 
189 Id. at 1118 (providing background by describing how the confederate government 
reached treaty agreements with Indian tribes). 
190 Id. at 1127 (stating that the ordinance contained provisions that “were clearly designed to 
prevent intrusions upon unceded land”).  The most pertinent provision stated 
The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians, their lands 
and property shall never be taken from them without their consent; and in their 
property, rights and liberty, they shall never be invaded or disturbed, unless in just 
and lawful wars authorized by Congress; but laws founded in justice and humanity 
shall from time to time be made, for preventing wrongs being done to them, and 
for preserving peace and friendship with them. 
An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States North West of 
the River Ohio, 1 Stat. 50 (1789).  See also Denis P. Duffey, The Northwest Ordinance as a 
Constitutional Document, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 933 (1995) (“[T]he Northwest Ordinance 
is a constitutional document because it authoritatively expresses a set of principles that 
have guided national political action.”). 
191 COHEN, supra note 69, § 1.02[3], at 24. 
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to prevent state encroachments on federal authority.192  The effect of 
the Indian Commerce Clause was to remove the caveat in the Articles 
of Confederation protecting state authority to manage affairs with 
Indians.  Paul Prucha has argued that the “lack of prolonged debate 
on the question was a sign of agreement within the convention that 
Indian affairs should be left in the hands of the federal govern-
ment.”193  Clinton, similarly, argues that the lack of debate shows that 
the convention was “curing rather than creating,” and that their ef-
forts simply served to “ratify this dominant view, an action that re-
quired and consumed little debate.”194 
The view that the Indian Commerce Clause was designed to cen-
tralize power over Indian affairs is further supported by the argu-
ments put forth in The Federalist.  John Jay argued that the centraliza-
tion of Indian affairs would prevent future turbulence of the kind 
experienced during the confederation period: 
Not a single Indian war has yet been occasioned by aggressions of the 
present Federal Government, feeble as it is, but there are several instanc-
es of Indian hostilities having been provoked by the improper conduct of 
individual States, who either unable or unwilling to restrain or punish of-
fenses, have given occasion to the slaughter of many innocent inhabit-
ants.195 
Similarly, Madison argued that, under the new Constitution, “[t]he 
regulation of commerce with the Indian tribes is very properly unfet-
tered from two limitations in the articles of confederation, which 
render the provision obscure and contradictory.”196  First, it was un-
clear under the Articles when Indians were “deemed members of a 
State.”197  Second, he argued that “how the trade with Indians, though 
not members of a State, yet residing within its legislative jurisdiction, 
can be regulated by an external authority, without so far intruding on 
the internal rights of legislation, is absolutely incomprehensible.”198  
Thus, the Articles “inconsiderately endeavored to accomplish impos-
sibilities.”199 
 
192 See Clinton, supra note 185, at 1152 (claiming that Madison “saw the problem as a matter 
of preventing state encroachment on the exercise of this national authority”). 
193 PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES:  THE HISTORY OF A POLITICAL ANOMALY 68 
(1994). 
194 See Clinton, supra note 185, at 1158. 
195 THE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay). 
196 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison). 
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. 
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In sum, Madison “sought to eliminate any and all claims to inher-
ent state power over Indian affairs.”200  The incompatibility of over-
lapping state and tribal authority demands a uniformity of federal 
policy that regulation of interstate commerce does not. 
This understanding does not necessarily conflict with the general 
Dormant Commerce Clause rule that “Congress may choose to over-
rule the judicial invalidation of a particular state regulation by statu-
torily authorizing it.”201  The prevailing arguments regarding the 
Dormant Indian Commerce Clause do not explicitly claim that it 
might limit the authority of the federal government to transfer its 
power to the states, although that certainly may be an implication.202  
Under a straightforward Dormant Commerce Clause theory, PL-280 
would be a perfectly valid congressional authorization of state power. 
What moves the Indian Commerce Clause from merely dormant 
to constitutionally preempted is that delegating power over Indian 
affairs to the states creates a problem of overlapping sovereignty that 
does not arise in normal Commerce Clause matters.  This point is il-
lustrated by the anti-federalist argument that sovereignty was indivisi-
ble and two sovereigns could reign over the same territory simultane-
ously.203  The Federalists maintained that such a problem would not 
arise under the Constitution because only the people were sover-
eign.204  The people could delegate authority to separate governments 
which would not pit the people against themselves any more than 
“two parallel lines [could] meet.”205  The specific structure of the 
Constitution—a supreme government of enumerated powers and 
governments possessing residual powers—offered a practical resolu-
 
200 Clinton, supra note 185, at 1245. 
201 Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional 
Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569, 570 (1987). 
202 See Clinton, supra note 185, at 1057–58 (rejecting the argument that the Indian Com-
merce Clause “imposed no judicially enforceable restraints on the exercise of state power 
over persons or property in Indian country.”); Stephen M. Feldman, Preemption and the 
Dormant Commerce Clause:  Implications for Federal Indian Law, 64 OR. L. REV. 667, 669 
(1986) (proposing a methodology for applying the Dormant Indian Commerce Clause in 
the context of state infringements upon tribal sovereignty); Richard D. Agnew, Note, The 
Dormant Indian Commerce Clause:  Up in Smoke?, 25 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 353, 379 (2001) (“A 
Dormant Indian Commerce Clause would provide the federal government the ability to 
arm itself with a new and more rigorous standard of review to protect the Indians from 
state incursions while exercising its fiduciary responsibility with the tribes.”). 
203 See Wood, supra note 87, at 527–28 (describing the anti-federalist argument that “two co-
ordinate sovereignties would be a solecism in politics . . . it would be contrary to the na-
ture of things that both should exist together—one or the other would necessarily tri-
umph in the fullness of dominion”). 
204 Id. at 530. 
205 Id. at 529. 
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tion of these views by preventing two popularly-authorized sovereigns 
from colliding. 
This overlapping sovereignty cannot be reconciled with the struc-
ture of the Constitution.206  A comparison of the Indian Commerce 
Clause to the Interstate Commerce Clause shows the problem with 
this situation.  PL-280 is the Indian Commerce Clause analogy to a 
law passed under the Interstate Commerce Clause granting a state 
the authority to regulate railroad traffic in another state.  These is-
sues of sovereignty have perhaps never arisen in a Dormant Com-
merce Clause setting because it is patently obvious that the structure 
of the Constitution does not allow Congress to extend one state’s ju-
risdiction into another state. 
The Indian Commerce Clause presents a strong basis for the ar-
gument that power over Indian affairs is constitutionally preempted.  
But, it only provides a basis for constitutional preemption if it pro-
vides a satisfying basis for federal power in the first place.  It is true 
that the Supreme Court has held that “the central function of the In-
dian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to 
legislate in the field of Indian affairs.”207  But, only a century earlier, 
the Court had found it to be a “very strained construction of this 
clause”208 to authorize the federal government to enact criminal laws 
governing on-reservation activity by tribal members.  While the origi-
nal understanding of the clause suggests a centralization of the au-
thority to manage Indian affairs in the federal government, it also 
suggests that federal authority was limited to the authority to engage 
in the kinds of bilateral relationships akin to those governed in the 
Foreign Commerce Clause.209  More to the point, the idea that the 
clause might give Congress authority to govern Indians directly is in-
 
206 James Wilson argued that the people “can distribute one portion of power to the more 
contracted circle called State governments; they can also furnish another proportion to 
the government of the United States.”  Id. at 530–31.  But, the Federalists claim that 
“[t]he two governments act in different manners, and for different purposes” contradicts 
the idea that two sovereigns—states and tribes—might exercise the same powers over the 
same territories.  Id. at 529. 
207 Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989). 
208 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378–79 (1886). 
209 Clinton, supra note 8, at 131 (“Since the Commerce Clause governs commerce with for-
eign nations, with which the United States maintained diplomatic contact, the covered 
commerce, at least in that context, must be the United States’ side of various bilateral ex-
changes with foreign nations, including not only trade with those nations . . . .”). 
1356 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:5 
 
consistent “with the basic Lockean popular delegation notions that 
animated the drafting of the [Constitution].”210 
For these reasons, despite the importance of the Indian Com-
merce Clause, federal power over Indian affairs must be supplement-
ed by another constitutional source.  Richard Monette has argued, 
“[T]he ‘Indian Commerce Clause’ alone is not a source of Union 
power over the tribes.  Such Union power requires the Treaty Clause 
and a treaty upon which to hang an inter-sovereign relationship.”211  
To fully understand constitutional preemption in terms of the state-
federal-tribal relationship, we must turn to the treaty power. 
2.  The Treaty Power and Treaty Federalism 
The Treaty Clause offers a natural solution to the problems that 
result from reliance on the Indian Commerce Clause as the source of 
federal power over Indian tribes.  This is not because the Treaty 
Clause by itself provides any source of federal authority over Indian 
tribes.  Instead, it provides a mechanism for treaty federalism, a fed-
eral relationship created through treaties made by governments ra-
ther than through constitutions made by the people.  Through treaty 
federalism, an independent sovereign cedes away some measure of its 
sovereignty to a central government, via treaty, in exchange for cer-
tain rights and responsibilities as a member unit in the federal rela-
tionship. 
Theories of treaty federalism have sought to justify and define the 
scope of federal power over Indian tribes independent of the Consti-
tution. Advocates of treaty federalism argue that Indian tribes have, 
through treaties, entered into a federal relationship with the federal 
government.212  Tribes exist on the same “plane” of sovereignty as 
states, although they do not play exactly the same role in the federal 
system as states do.213  By entering into a federal relationship with the 
union, tribes gave up their status as international actors, but retained 
 
210 Id. at 133.  Clinton reaches this conclusion based on the straightforward logic that “Indi-
ans were not then citizens, not represented in the Constitutional convention, and not 
participants in the state ratification debates.”  Id. 
211 Monette, supra note 8, at 640. 
212 See Barsh & Henderson, supra note 8, at 275 (describing the tribal federalism procedure 
requiring the consent of the tribal people and two-thirds of the Senate). 
213 See Monette, supra note 8, at 619 (“[T]he relationship between the states and the tribes 
should reflect the relationship between two states as sovereigns within the same system, 
on the same plane, whose sovereign spheres do not overlap but influence each other 
through the federal political processes.”); see also Barsh & Henderson, supra note 8, at 270 
(describing treaties as “political compacts irrevocably annexing tribes into the federal sys-
tem in a status parallel to, but not identical with, that of the states”). 
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their residual powers, much like the states retained their residual 
powers as described in the Tenth Amendment.214 
Treaty federalism provides not only a powerful descriptive model 
for the federal-state-tribal relationship, but also a strong normative 
model, for several reasons.  First, it resolves the crucial issue of “con-
sent of the governed.”215  The Constitution does not provide a satisfy-
ing expression of consent by Indian tribes because tribes did not par-
ticipate in the constitutional convention or otherwise have a voice in 
the creation of the federal republic.216  Although they are an imper-
fect expression of consent, treaties provide the vital link through 
which tribes have consented to the authority of the federal govern-
ment.217  Thus, treaty federalism reinforces the basic principles of 
popular sovereignty that date back to Bodin, Hobbes, Locke, and 
Rousseau, and were reinforced by the federalist vision of the Consti-
tution.218 
Treaty federalism is also a useful normative model because it an-
swers many of the pragmatic concerns that weaken stronger theories 
of tribal self-government.  It recognizes that tribes have, to some de-
 
214 Monette argues that the Supreme Court’s application of Tenth Amendment principles to 
the state-federal relationship is directly analogous to its application of those principles to 
the tribal-federal relationship.  Monette, supra note 8, at 634–37.  Thus, “the source of 
sovereignty is the people or their local government unit, whether states or tribe; and the 
directional transfer of that sovereign authority is from those local governments or their 
people to the Union, not vice-versa.”  Id. at 636–37.  For Barsh and Henderson, the rele-
vance of the Tenth Amendment is the idea that the people of the states retained their 
right to form (or re-form) local political structures, as long as they remain within the 
bounds of the Constitution.  Barsh & Henderson, supra note 8, at 261–62.  By analogy, if a 
treaty “did not relinquish the right to self-government by express terms, then the people 
of the tribe must retain the right, enjoyed previously, of changing the form of their gov-
ernment.”  Id. at 262. 
215 See Monette, supra note 8, at 632 (“[T]he treaty provides perhaps the best answer to one 
question which seems to plague scholars of Indian law . . . .  Have American Indian peo-
ple consented to American government? . . .  In the treaties, tribes authorized or at least 
consented to the federative nature of the Union/tribe relationship.”). 
216 See Clinton, supra note 8, at 133 (noting that the Indians were not citizens at the time of 
the Constitutional Convention, were not represented in the Convention, and were not 
participants in the state ratification debates); see also Monette, supra note 8, at 632 (argu-
ing that treaty negotiations instead “served for tribes the function that the constitutional 
convention served for states”). 
217 Barsh & Henderson, supra note 8, at 276 (describing how some tribes required a tribal 
consensus to enter into a treaty with the U.S. and how federal authority arose out of this 
consensus). 
218 See id. at 278–79 (explaining how the will of tribe was essential for treaty federalism).  
Barsh and Henderson explicitly reject the idea that federal power over Indian tribes arose 
out of “conquest,” arguing that, treaty federalism “rests on principles more consonant 
with American government.”  Id. at 279. 
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gree, entered into the fold of the federal system.219  Russell Lawrence 
Barsh and James Youngblood Henderson, for example, advocate trea-
ty federalism as an alternative “for the creative establishment of gov-
ernments in circumstances where conventional statehood would be 
economically, socially or politically inappropriate, but where both 
sovereignties recognize the expedience of permanent union.”220  Alt-
hough theoretically, treaty federalism is directly dependent on the 
terms of the treaties, a balancing of pragmatic concerns might sug-
gest a uniform theory of treaty federalism that defines the rights and 
responsibilities of all tribes in relation to the federal government.221  
The treaty relationship, as a whole, forms a set of constitutional 
norms defining the union-tribe relationship on a similar basis to the 
union-state relationship.  In doing so, the treaty clause preserves the 
constitutional structure of a government supreme over certain enu-
merated powers operating on mutual terms with a government that 
exercises residual powers:  the theoretical structure used to resolve 
the anti-federalist concern about the unitary nature of sovereignty. 
The federal-tribal relationship created by treaty federalism sup-
ports the doctrine of constitutional preemption and precludes states 
from exercising political power over Indian affairs for two reasons.  
First, it supports the proposition that federal power over Indian af-
fairs is “absolutely and totally repugnant”222 to a similar power in the 
states.  It does so by emphasizing that federal power over Indian af-
fairs arises from a structure external to the constitution itself.  Trea-
ties are delegations of power—with reciprocal duties of good faith—
from tribal governments to the sovereign federal government, not 
from tribal members to the federal government.223  Tribes vested 
power in the federal government via their authority to make treaties 
as independent governments, not merely as part of “the peo-
ple . . . composing the distinct and independent States” that formed 
 
219 Id. at 274 (“Regardless of their original intent, [treaties] have resulted in a complete po-
litical and economic integration of tribes into the federal system.  Separation is practically 
impossible.”). 
220 Id. at 275. 
221 Barsh and Henderson advocate a constitutional amendment affirming treaty federalism, 
suggesting “a standardization of tribal powers on the state model to avoid the prospect of 
endless judicial interpretations and tribe-by-tribe distinctions.”  Id. at 280.  They also ar-
gue that, because of the complete integration of tribes into the federal system, “it is all 
the more essential that their political rights be secured on a fixed and certain basis.”  Id. 
at 275. 
222 Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 318 (1851). 
223 Monette, supra note 8, at 631–32. 
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the Constitution.224  The powers arising from treaty federalism do not 
flow from the popular sovereign that created the Constitution, but 
instead flow directly through the Treaty Clause, a uniquely federal 
mechanism for political agreement.225  As the Supreme Court has 
emphasized, the power to engage in foreign relations is exclusively 
federal.226  While tribes may no longer be “foreign” or “international” 
actors in the truest sense,227 the fact that the federal-tribal relationship 
came into being through treaties emphasizes the inherently federal 
nature of the power to manage Indian affairs. 
Second, treaty federalism supports the constitutional preemption 
of Indian affairs by placing the focus of federal power on the treaty 
relationship itself.  Treaties themselves sometimes contained terms 
explicitly precluding state inference with tribal affairs.228  But, explicit 
terms are even less important than the principles that drive the treaty 
process.  A central principle is that treaties are “not a grant of rights 
to the Indians, but a grant of rights from them—a reservation of 
those not granted.”229  Just as the nature of the Constitution would 
logically prohibit the federal government from giving one state polit-
ical power over another state, the nature of treaty federalism logically 
prohibits the federal government from delegating away the power 
that treaties vested solely in it.  This principle is consistent with the 
Lockean idea that consent-based government authority must remain 
 
224 THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison); see also Prucha, supra note 193, at 65 (“Consid-
eration of the Indians as ‘nations’ not as members of the states seemed essential if con-
gressional authority was to prevail over that of states . . . . ”). 
225 Along with the Indian Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court has pointed to the treaty 
clause as a mechanism through which Congress has gained legislative power over Indian 
tribes.  See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201 (2004) (“The treaty power does not lit-
erally authorize Congress to act legislatively . . . .  But . . . treaties made pursuant to that 
power can authorize Congress to deal with matters with which otherwise Congress could 
not deal.”  (citations and quotations omitted)). 
226 See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 436 (1968) (describing foreign and international 
affairs as “matters which the Constitution entrusts solely to the federal government”); 
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) (holding that the federal government has 
“full and exclusive responsibility for the conduct of affairs with foreign sovereignties”).  
The Constitution also explicitly prohibits states from engaging in treaty-making.  U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 10. 
227 See Monette, supra note 8, at 631 (noting that treaties with tribes represent an “interna-
tional relationship between two independent sovereigns”). 
228 Perhaps the most famous example of this is the treaty discussed in Worcester v. Georgia, in 
which, as described by Chief Justice Marshall, the United States “acknowledge[d] the said 
Cherokee nation to be a sovereign nation, authorized [sic] to govern themselves, and all 
persons who have settled within their territory, free from any right of legislative interfer-
ence by the several states composing the United States of America, in reference to acts 
done within their own territory.”  31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 530 (1832). 
229 United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905). 
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in the hands of the entity to which the people grant such authority.230  
Therefore, treaty federalism constitutionally preempts the exercise of 
state power over Indian affairs through the very logic of the treaty re-
lationship.  Because the Framers sought to remedy the turbulence 
that resulted when individual states dealt with Indian tribes,231 placing 
the focus of federal power on the logic of the treaty relationship em-
phasizes the importance of “harmony and uniformity” in Indian law. 
In these ways, treaty federalism squarely supports the idea that 
power over Indian affairs is inherently federal and constitutionally 
preempted.  It provides both an accurate conception of the nature of 
the federal-tribal relationship and a legitimate basis for federal power 
grounded in constitutional norms of popular sovereignty and federal-
ism.  Treaty federalism grounds the federal power over Indian affairs 
in a source external to the Constitution itself:  treaties that expressly 
and impliedly declined to authorize state power over Indian tribes.  
Because treaties so fundamentally define the relationship of tribes to 
the union, they have taken on a “constitutional” status even though 
they are not part of the Constitution itself. 
C.  Applying Constitutional Preemption to PL-280 
In Part I, this Article noted that courts dealing with the constitu-
tionality of PL-280 generally held that either, (1) Congress was enti-
tled to “withdraw” from portions of the field of Indian affairs;232 or, 
(2) Congress could validly delegate its authority over Indian affairs to 
the states.233  If the power over Indian affairs is an exclusively federal, 
and therefore constitutionally-preempted, power, neither of these 
approaches offers plausible constitutional justifications for PL-280. 
 
230 See LOCKE, supra note 89, § 141 (“The legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws 
to any other hands; for it being but a delegated power from the people, they who have it 
cannot pass it over to others.”). 
231 James Madison, the architect of the Indian Commerce Clause, “desired explicitly to pre-
vent state encroachments on the exclusive commitment of power to the federal govern-
ment to regulate affairs with the Indian tribes.”  Clinton, supra note 185, at 1155.  Clinton 
argues that the Framers, and Madison in particular, responded to rifts between the states 
and the federal government that “had brought the nation to the brink of a general Indi-
an war or, at least, serious frontier clashes” in several states.  Id. at 1157; see also COHEN, 
supra note 69, § 1.02[3], at 24 (describing the tensions between states and tribes during 
the confederation period). 
232 See, e.g., Anderson v. Britton, 318 P.2d 291, 300 (Or. 1957) (“[T]he federal government 
may withdraw from the field and turn the subject matter back to the states, when it 
chooses to do so.”). 
233 See, e.g., State v. Fanning, 759 P.2d 937, 940 n.3 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988) (acknowledging 
the theory “that states possess inherent jurisdiction which lies dormant while federal ju-
risdiction exists”). 
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1.  PL-280 as a “Withdrawal” of Federal Power 
Accepting that constitutional preemption prohibits a state from 
exercising inherently federal powers, it follows that Congress cannot 
merely “withdraw” from a field of authority and allow states to take 
over.  Following from this principle to reach the conclusion that PL-
280 is unconstitutional requires a more precise definition of “the 
power over Indian affairs.” 
Treaty federalism, by itself, does not provide a clear answer re-
garding the precise scope of federal power over Indian tribes.  Fortu-
nately, it is unnecessary to determine this scope because a clear con-
stitutional principle can be determined independent of the scope of 
federal power.  This basic principle is that the Constitution precludes 
states from exercising any power over Indians in Indian country, re-
gardless of how much power the Constitution permits the federal 
government to exercise. 
That this principle is constitutionally sound can be illustrated by 
imagining the two extremes of the spectrum of federal power over 
tribes.  At one extreme, the Constitution authorizes the federal gov-
ernment only to engage with Indian tribes as sovereign governments, 
and treaties preserve the relationship on an international plane.  Un-
der this view, the states obviously have no power over tribes, because 
tribes never came within the purview of the Constitution in the first 
place.  Thus, the federal government may act pursuant to treaties, 
just as it might, for example, construct a military base in a foreign 
country with that country’s consent.  But, such an agreement does 
not permit the federal government to place citizens of that country 
under the jurisdiction of a state; such a suggestion would be ludi-
crous—not because of constitutional preemption, but because the 
foreign country is not even within the political scope of the Constitu-
tion in the first place. 
The second view, which has been adopted by the Supreme Court, 
is that Congress has “plenary power” over Indian tribes.  This view is 
primarily grounded in the Indian Commerce Clause.234  Under this 
view, because Congress has power over every aspect of Indian affairs, 
every aspect of Indian affairs should be constitutionally preempted.  
This is true for several reasons.  As a historical matter, the plenary-
power doctrine arose directly from a perceived need to protect tribes 
 
234 See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989) (“[T]he central 
function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to 
legislate in the field of Indian affairs.”) 
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from dangers posed by states.235  But more importantly, the very no-
tion of plenary power mandates the constitutional preemption of In-
dian affairs.  After all, how can a power of the kind described in our 
Indian law jurisprudence—so “all-encompassing” that tribal sover-
eignty “exists only at the sufferance of Congress”236—not be repug-
nant to a similar power in the states?  Naturally, if power over Indian 
affairs is constitutionally preempted and power over Indian affairs 
means power over everything pertaining to Indian affairs, then the 
power over everything pertaining to Indian affairs is constitutionally 
preempted. 
Treaty federalism suggests that federal power falls somewhere be-
tween these two extremes.  Federal power over tribes is dictated by 
the federal nature of the treaty relationship.237  The scope of federal 
power pursuant to a treaty does not affect the scope of state power 
over Indian tribes.  Whatever power the federal government assumes 
under treaty federalism is constitutionally preempted; whatever pow-
er it did not assume did not come within the purview of the constitu-
tional polity in the first place, and thereby, cannot be exercised by 
states.  Thus, if the federal government does not have the power, 
then certainly states do not—a point supported by the Apportion-
ment Clause’s exclusion of “Indians not taxed” from state representa-
tion, which can be seen as constitutional confirmation that Indians 
are outside the scope of state jurisdiction.238 
Therefore, the Constitution precludes states from exercising any 
power over Indians in Indian country.  This principle remains true re-
gardless of how broadly one defines federal power over Indian affairs. 
The word “over” is important because constitutional preemption 
should not lead to the conclusion that states are powerless in their re-
lations with tribes.  It simply means that the relationship of states to 
tribes is one of government-to-government.  This principle places 
states and tribes on the same “plane” of sovereignty in our federal sys-
tem.239  Just as states have the constitutional authority to engage in 
 
235 See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383–84 (1886) (describing how the states be-
came the Indians’ deadliest enemies and that the federal government thus has a duty to 
protect the Indians from the states). 
236 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 319, 323 (1978). 
237 See supra text accompanying notes 212–31. 
238 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (amending art. I, § 2); Monette, 
supra note 8, at 630 n.83 (explaining that the significance of the Apportionment Clause’s 
“Indians not taxed” provision is its “imperative construction that Indians not taxed by the 
state are not within the polity of the state, especially not subject to its jurisdiction”). 
239 See Monette, supra note 8, at 619 (arguing that two sovereigns on such a plane would “in-
fluence each other through the federal political processes”). 
May 2013] PREEMPTION, PUBLIC LAW 280, AND FEDERALISM 1363 
 
discussion and agreement with each other, constitutional preemption 
does not necessarily preclude states and tribes from engaging one 
another. 
In this sense, applying constitutional preemption to PL-280 per-
forms a simple task:  it gives constitutional status to the consent prin-
ciple that forms the basis for popular sovereignty.240  One might, as 
suggested by President Eisenhower, view it as morally wrong that 
tribes are placed under the authority of states without their con-
sent,241 but the only apparent mechanism for correcting this situation 
is a political one.  Congress, imposing an after-the-fact consent re-
quirement into PL-280, appears to have acknowledged the moral 
problem with permitting states to exercise power over Indians in In-
dian country without tribal consent.242  Through constitutional 
preemption, the consent requirement can be protected by judicial 
review, rather than a political mechanism. 
PL-280 is unconstitutional because it grants states an exclusively 
federal authority over Indians in Indian country.  But, it would not 
necessarily be unconstitutional to the extent that it allowed tribes to 
consent to state authority.  Under treaty federalism, the federal gov-
ernment is permitted to authorize a government-to-government rela-
tionship akin to interstate compacts. 
Furthermore, the principle that the Constitution prohibits state 
power over Indians in Indian country is a reflection of the specific 
powers delegated in PL-280.  The principle does not apply to Indians 
within state jurisdiction; similarly, it would not prohibit a state from, 
for example, taxing income earned by non-Indians on Indian lands.  
The boundaries of the general rule might be less clear where a strong 
state interest conflicts with the interests of tribal self-government.  
The Preemption Doctrine as currently applied in Indian law would 
have to be reformulated; courts would have to ask not only whether 
state power is preempted by relevant statutes and treaties, but wheth-
er it is preempted by the Constitution itself.243  The shift would be 
 
240 See Richard B. Collins, Indian Consent to American Government, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 365, 386 
(1989) (describing the importance of the principle of “consent of the governed” in Indi-
an law jurisprudence). 
241 Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 38, at 1406–07 (“President Eisenhower indicated that the 
lack of such a provision left him with grave doubts.”  (internal citations omitted)). 
242 Id. (describing how moral outrage led to Congress finally amending PL-280 to require 
tribal consent). 
243 Thus, constitutional preemption might be thought of as an extension of the holding in 
McClanahan, which held that Indian sovereignty “provides a backdrop against which the 
applicable treaties and federal statutes must be read.”  McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax 
Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).  Instead of the approach in McClanahan, this Article 
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subtle but important.  While it may be difficult to apply constitutional 
preemption in hard cases, PL-280 is a legislative act that would be 
clearly unconstitutional. 
2.  PL-280 as a “Delegation” of Federal Power 
The constitutional preemption doctrine this Article has described 
and the Nondelegation Doctrine are closely intertwined–recall that 
Knickerbocker and Sharpnack both hinged on the Nondelegation Doc-
trine.244  The difference between the two is whether states have the 
authority to receive the power in question and whether Congress has 
the authority to delegate the power in question.  Thus, even if PL-280 is 
a delegation, it is invalidated by the doctrine of constitutional 
preemption.  The principles of the Nondelegation Doctrine, howev-
er, help reinforce the conclusion that PL-280 is unconstitutional. 
The basis for the idea that the legislature cannot delegate legisla-
tive power to another body again arises from Locke, who argued:  
“The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making 
laws to anybody else, or place it anywhere but where the people 
have.”245  Locke based this argument on the fact that the participants 
to the social compact only agreed to “submit to rules, and be gov-
erned by laws made by such men, and in such forms.”246  Thus, the 
people grant the legislature only the power to make laws, and not to 
make legislators.247 
Locke’s point here was merely the result of his original justifica-
tions for the social compact.  If the legislature can delegate its author-
ity away to other entities, then it would undermine the purpose of en-
tering into a social compact.248  When a person enters into the social 
compact, he or she gives up the right to protect his or her own prop-
 
presents a stronger notion of preemption, which goes a step beyond treaties and statutes 
to the Constitution itself.  Although this Article does not endorse McClanahan’s rejection 
of “platonic notions of Indian sovereignty,” id., the idea of preemption plays a part in de-
fining the legal boundaries of state, federal, and tribal authority. 
244 See infra text accompanying notes 167–78. 
245 LOCKE, supra note 89, § 142, at 72. 
246 Id. § 141, at 71. 
247 Id. (explaining that the people are bound only by laws “enacted by those whom they have 
chosen and authorized to make laws for them” and not by other men). 
248 In other words, the very purpose of the social compact is to form “a community . . .  with 
a power to act as one body.” Id. § 96, at 48.  If the sovereign begins delegating its powers 
back to members of the community, the result is simply a return to the state of nature. 
May 2013] PREEMPTION, PUBLIC LAW 280, AND FEDERALISM 1365 
 
erty on the condition that all others are giving it up as well.249  If the 
legislature gives that power back to one person, or to all of them, the 
most basic terms of the social contract have been violated. 
Although Locke’s insistence that the sovereign makes laws and 
not legislators has been applied in cases to support the argument that 
the legislative branch cannot confer authority upon the executive 
branch,250 it is equally applicable where the legislature delegates au-
thority upon a state legislature.  Popular sovereignty underpins con-
stitutional preemption:  the citizens of the states, by entering the un-
ion, authorized Congress to regulate commerce with Indian tribes 
and authorized the president to make treaties.251  It is hard to imagine 
what theory permits Congress the authority to grant these powers to 
the states.252  Like the participants in Locke’s social compact, the 
people of the United States vested in Congress sole legislative power 
over certain matters.253  Granting state legislators the authority to ap-
ply criminal and civil laws against a new group of people254 certainly 
falls more under the category of making legislators than of making 
laws.255 
Like federalism, which can be seen as a vertical separation of pow-
ers, a horizontal separation of powers is rooted in the Constitution.256  
 
249 Id. § 97, at 49 (explaining that in forming a government, each man leaves the state of na-
ture to fend for himself and puts himself under an obligation to submit for the determi-
nation of the majority). 
250 See, e.g. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 419–20 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (ex-
plaining that there is no acceptable delegation of legislative power); Indus. Union Dep’t v. 
Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 673 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (“[T]his Court 
expressly recognized the existence of and the necessity for limits on Congress’ ability to 
delegate its authority to representatives of the Executive Branch.”).  But see Bank One 
Chi., N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 280 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(using Locke to argue against deriving legislative intent from committee activity). 
251 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress power to “regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 
2, cl. 2 (describing how the president has the power “to make Treaties”). 
252 Congress has, on occasion, delegated power to the states that would otherwise be pre-
cluded by the Dormant Commerce Clause.  However, those laws can be seen as an act of 
Congress “relinquishing” its authority over an area of concurrent jurisdiction, whereas 
PL-280 constitutes a positive grant of authority to states that the states otherwise would 
not have had. 
253  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Con-
gress of the United States . . . .”). 
254 See 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006) (granting state law relating to criminal offenses “the same 
force and effect within such Indian country as they have elsewhere in the State”); 28 
U.S.C. § 1360 (2006) (granting state law relating to civil disputes “the same force and ef-
fect within such Indian country as they have elsewhere in the State”). 
255 LOCKE, supra note 89, § 141, at 71. 
256 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) (“The accumulation of all powers legislative, 
executive, and judiciary, in the same hands . . .  may justly be pronounced the very defini-
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Much of the relevant case law on the issue of delegation arises from 
questions of separation of powers between the branches of the feder-
al government, not questions of federalism.257  But, both vertical and 
horizontal separations of powers serve the same essential purpose,258 
so there is no reason to think that an unconstitutional congressional 
delegation of power made to an administrative agency would be con-
stitutional if it were made to a state legislature.  Therefore, it is help-
ful to examine jurisprudence on the issue of Congress’s ability to del-
egate power to the executive.  To which entity Congress is delegating 
power is not as relevant as the fact that Congress delegated away its 
exclusive powers at all.259 
The Nondelegation Doctrine is based on the concept that the 
Constitution vests “a particular kind and quantity of power in a specif-
ic institution.”260  A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States dealt with 
a law authorizing trade associations to develop “codes of fair competi-
tion” that would take effect upon approval of the president. 261  Hold-
ing the law unconstitutional, the Court reasoned that “Congress is 
not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential legisla-
tive functions with which it is thus vested.”262  The Court recognized, 
however, that Congress needed some flexibility in allowing others to 
handle the details that it was incapable of managing.263  When review-
 
tion of tyranny.”); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124 (1975) (“The principle of sep-
aration of powers was not simply an abstract generalization in the minds of the Framers:  
it was woven into the document that they drafted in Philadelphia in the summer of 
1787.”). 
257 See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448 (1998) (holding that the presidential 
line-item veto violates the separation-of-powers doctrine); Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 957–59 (1983) (explaining that a statutory House of 
Representatives veto power violates the separation of powers doctrine). 
258 Madison, for example, argued: 
Whilst all authority in [the federal republic] will be derived from and dependent 
on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests and 
classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals or of the minority, will be in little 
danger from interested combinations of the majority. 
  THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
259 See, e.g., United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 298 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(“The vice in the Schechter case was not that the President was the one who received the 
delegated authority, but that the Congress had abdicated the lawmaking function.  The 
result should be the same whether the lawmaking authority, constituted by Congress, is 
the President or a State.”). 
260 Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 337 (2002). 
261 295 U.S. 495, 523, 529 (1935). 
262 Id. at 529. 
263 Id. at 530 (“[T]he Constitution has never been regarded as denying to Congress the nec-
essary resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to perform its function 
in laying down policies and establishing standards, while leaving to selected instrumental-
ities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits . . . .”). 
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ing such a delegation, the courts “cannot be allowed to obscure the 
limitations of the authority to delegate, if our constitutional system is 
to be maintained.”264  In the end, the delegation of power in Schechter 
was simply too broad:  “Instead of prescribing rules of conduct, it au-
thorize[d] the making of codes to prescribe them.”265 
The Nondelegation Doctrine, thus, requires that Congress lay 
down “an intelligible principle to which the person or body author-
ized to [act] is directed to conform.”266  Essentially, if Congress “legis-
late[s] and indicate[s]” its will, it can then give another body the 
“power to fill up the details.”267 
While the Nondelegation Doctrine itself might provide a convinc-
ing argument against PL-280, it is more important to us insofar as it 
presents another perspective on why constitutional preemption so 
clearly applies.  Recall that the court in Sharpnack upheld the Assimi-
lative Crimes Act on the grounds that Congress could prospectively 
“adopt” state law as its own.268  Suppose that PL-280 did not grant 
states wholesale jurisdiction over Indian tribes, but rather acted only 
to incorporate state law as federal law.  Such a law could be squared 
with Sharpnack in two ways.  First, it could be distinguished on the 
grounds that the power over federal enclaves simply is not exclusively 
federal.  But, such an argument seems tenuous, and there is no rea-
son to think that it is any more exclusively federal than the federal 
power over Indian affairs.  Second, it might be that Sharpnack was 
wrongly decided; the doctrine of constitutional preemption, as this 
Article has outlined it, would likely preclude state legislation over in-
herently federal powers, even if the law did not grant wholesale juris-
diction. 
PL-280 cannot be justified under Sharpnack because the justifica-
tion in Sharpnack that Congress can “adopt” state law does not apply 
when Congress grants wholesale jurisdiction over a matter.  Giving 
states legislative jurisdiction, and thus “adopting” state law as federal 
law, is fundamentally different than giving states both executive and 
judicial power.  Even if Congress could prospectively adopt state law, 
 
264 Id. 
265 Id. at 541.  This distinction, of course, is analogous to Locke’s distinction between “mak-
ing laws” and “constituting the legislative.”  See LOCKE, supra note 89, § 141, at 71. 
266 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 484 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting 
J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)) (emphasis omitted). 
267 United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517, 521 (1911) (“[T]he authority to make ad-
ministrative rules is not a delegation of legislative power . . . .”). 
268 See United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 293–94 (1958) (“Rather than being a dele-
gation by Congress of its legislative authority to the States, it is a deliberate continuing 
adoption by Congress . . . .”). 
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it could not conceivably “adopt” the decision of every state prosecu-
tor, judge, and law enforcement agent that acts pursuant to the pow-
ers granted in PL-280.  Such an idea is not only absurd as a practical 
matter; it is premised on the idea that Congress can make legislative, 
executive, and judicial decisions over matters involving Indian affairs.  
Therefore, the Nondelegation Doctrine is helpful not because PL-280 
should be conceived of as an unconstitutional delegation, but be-
cause the doctrine illustrates how PL-280 is something much more 
problematic than an unconstitutional delegation.  It is a wholesale 
grant of federal power to the states in a manner that is inconsistent 
with principles of federalism and popular sovereignty. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has outlined an argument against the constitutionality 
of PL-280.  PL-280 is only one piece of the Indian law puzzle, but it 
clearly demonstrates the need to reinterpret federal Indian law with 
our principles of constitutionalism and popular sovereignty.  Doing 
so will strengthen the quality and integrity of both Indian law and 
constitutional law.  In conclusion, PL-280 offers two key lessons.  First, 
it sheds light on the nature of sovereignty and emphasizes that Indian 
law will remain in a state of confusion until we come up with a clear 
federalism-based solution to the question of Indian sovereignty.  Se-
cond, it emphasizes the need to continually enforce the boundaries 
of American federalism as a means of preserving the sovereignty of 
the American people. 
Federal Indian law has turned the concept of sovereignty upside-
down.  Justice Clarence Thomas best expressed the problem caused 
by our current system of Indian-law jurisprudence.  In United States v. 
Lara, Supreme Court upheld a federal law that affirmed tribal author-
ity to prosecute Indians who were not members of that tribe.269  The 
Court based its reasoning, in part, on the idea of Congressional ple-
nary power.270  Justice Thomas concurred but attacked the very notion 
of this type of plenary power.271  He argued that “the tribes either are 
or are not separate sovereigns, and our federal Indian law cases un-
tenably hold both positions simultaneously.”272  In other words, the 
 
269 541 U.S. 193, 196 (2004). 
270 Id. at 200. 
271 Id. at 215 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I cannot agree with the Court . . . that the Constitu-
tion grants to Congress plenary power to calibrate the ‘metes and bounds of tribal sover-
eignty.’”  (internal citation omitted)). 
272 Id. 
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idea that Congress has unlimited power over tribes is inconsistent 
with the idea of sovereignty.273  Thomas went on to argue that “[t]he 
Court utterly fails to find any provision of the Constitution that gives 
Congress enumerated power to alter tribal sovereignty.”274  Until the 
Court analyzes questions of Congressional power over tribes “honestly 
and rigorously, the confusion that [Thomas] identified will continue 
to haunt our cases.”275 
Justice Thomas is correct:  the position that tribes possess inher-
ent sovereignty is simply inconsistent with the position that Congress 
can exercise plenary power over them.  PL-280 clearly embodies the 
problems of our current system.  With the passage of PL-280, Con-
gress passed on the financial and administrative burden of dealing 
with Indian tribes to states.276  In doing so, it significantly blurred the 
lines between state, tribal, and federal power.  This has required seri-
ous Supreme Court interpretation on several major occasions, and 
even those decisions have proven unsatisfactory to clarify the scope of 
the law.277  It is time to clear up some of this confusion by critically 
considering the constitutional validity of PL-280 and taking the nec-
essary action to bring it in line with principles of popular sovereignty. 
History has recognized the termination policy on which PL-280 
was built as a mistake,278 and the dominant strain of thinking now 
 
273 Id. at 218 (“It is quite arguably the essence of sovereignty not to exist merely at the whim 
of an external government.”). 
274 Id. at 224. 
275 Id. at 226. 
276 Goldberg & Champagne, supra note 32, at 704 (“A notable feature of [PL-280] is the ab-
sence of any federal funding support for the states’ new law enforcement and criminal 
justice duties.”). 
277 See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 208 (1987) (applying the 
distinction between criminal and regulatory laws to determine whether Indian gaming is 
permissible); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 390 (1976) (holding that PL-280 did 
not confer taxing jurisdiction over tribes); Emma Garrison, Baffling Distinctions Between 
Criminal and Regulatory:  How Public Law 280 Allows Vague Notions of State Policy to Trump 
Tribal Sovereignty, 8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 449, 481 (2004) (concluding that that the 
criminal/regulatory distinction is largely meaningless and unpredictable and that efforts 
should be made to clarify and repeal PL-280). 
278 See Michael C. Walch, Terminating The Indian Termination Policy, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1181, 
1190–92 (1983) (describing the abandonment of the termination policy).  Walch notes:  
“Official repudiation of the termination policy came in 1969, when President Nixon 
called for Indian policy of ‘self-determination without termination.’  According to Nixon, 
forced termination was ‘wrong,’ and the goal of Indian policy had to be ‘to strengthen 
the Indian’s sense of autonomy without threatening his sense of community.’”  Id. at 1191 
(internal citation omitted).  Although Nixon signaled the official end to termination, de-
partures from it had begun with the Kennedy Administration, and President Lyndon 
Johnson had also specifically called for an end to termination.  See Raymond V. Butler, 
The Bureau of Indian Affairs:  Activities Since 1945, 436 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 
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runs in favor of tribal self-government.279  The basic contradiction de-
scribed by Justice Thomas lies at the heart of the problem, and PL-
280 is only the most egregious embodiment of that problem.  Barsh 
and Henderson have offered what may be the best solution in the 
form of a constitutional amendment to clarify the state-tribal-federal 
relationship.280  We may need a “constitutional moment” to offer con-
sidered judgment of the American people on a question that has pre-
sented a constitutional quagmire for over a century.  This constitu-
tional solution should affirm the status of tribes as units in a federal 
system, complete with the constitutional protection of their authority.  
It should clarify that states and tribes are co-equal governments and 
offer a mechanism for agreements between the two to further coop-
erative interests.  However, it should also encompass all viewpoints 
and critically ask the hard questions about state and tribal sovereign-
ty, including what role tribes and tribal members should have in state 
governments that may have little power over tribes and tribal mem-
bers.281 
PL-280 is not only a reflection of the confused theoretical basis of 
federal Indian law; it is also a reflection of the struggle to preserve the 
boundaries of a federal system.  The term “federalism” is often asso-
ciated with the promotion of state sovereignty, no doubt in reaction 
to the fact that the last century of politics has been defined by the 
growth of federal power.  But federalism is a two-sided coin.  Alt-
hough this Article has advocated certain limitations on state power, a 
reasonably applied doctrine of constitutional preemption will have 
the long-term effect of strengthening the federal system.  A judicial 
system unwilling to take seriously the constitutional constraints on 
state power built into our federal system is unlikely to take seriously 
the reciprocal constraints on federal power.  The complete deference 
the Court has shown to Congress on Indian law matters—even where 
Congress has chosen to delegate away its own power—negatively af-
 
50, 54–57 (1978); see also Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412 
(1968) (holding that the Termination Act did not extinguish treaty rights). 
279 See Walch, supra note 280, at 1191 (“[F]ederal Indian policy since [Nixon’s] time has fol-
lowed President Nixon’s call to emphasize the role of tribal governments and the right of 
Indians to choose their own destiny.”). 
280 Barsh and Henderson advocate a constitutional resolution that will “clarify the reserved 
territorial powers of tribes, rejecting the authority of Congress to arrogate power unilat-
erally over tribes without denying [the] tribe’s authority to delegate additional powers to 
Congress.” Barsh & Henderson, supra note 8, at 280. 
281 In the constitutional amendment proposed by Barsh and Henderson, for example, they 
advocate withdrawing the right of Indians to vote in the state political process, arguing 
that “no community already largely assimilated into a state or financial dependant on it 
will lightly trade its existing franchise for political autonomy.”  Id. at 282. 
May 2013] PREEMPTION, PUBLIC LAW 280, AND FEDERALISM 1371 
 
fects the health of a federal system that depends on a judiciary willing 
to make difficult judgments about the boundaries of state and federal 
power.  Therefore, although the Framers primarily feared the aggran-
dizement of congressional power,282 the reckless delegation of congres-
sional power may be just as dangerous or constitutionally illegiti-
mate283 because the boundaries of the federal system were put in 
place by the sovereign American people, not to be altered by normal 
political activity. 
The primary purpose of this Article has been to set out the theo-
retical basis for a doctrine of constitutional preemption and apply 
that doctrine to PL-280.  In doing so, this Article has argued that PL-
280 illustrates the need to reinterpret federal Indian law in light of 
American constitutional principles of federalism and popular sover-
eignty.  Recognizing the unconstitutionality of PL-280 would be a step 
toward clarifying the confused nature of sovereignty that defines fed-
eral Indian law, but it would also help strengthen and preserve our 
commitment to American federalism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
282 Madison argued: “In republican government, the legislative authority, necessarily, pre-
dominates.”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).  David Epstein describes the fed-
eralist argument:  “Precisely because the legislature seems closest to the people, it is most 
dangerous to the people; it sees its closeness as ‘influence’ which it can use in the service 
of its own enterprising ambition.”  DAVID F. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE 
FEDERALIST 132 (1984). 
283 Norman Williams succinctly argued, with regard to the Dormant Commerce Clause, “[i]f 
Congress wishes to foster state protectionism, it must do so directly.  In only that way can 
we rest assured that the responsibility for such action will be laid at Congress’s door.”  
Williams, supra note 79, at 238. 
